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DISOBEDIENCE AND CONTEMPT
Margit Livingston*
Abstract: A court's power to impose contempt sanctions on recalcitrant individuals is
essential to ensure orderly judicial proceedings and obedience of judicial decrees. Despite
repeated efforts to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt and the procedures
required for each, the U.S. Supreme Court arguably has failed to delineate a precise
demarcation between the two that considers both the due process interests of alleged
contemnors and the remedial needs of party plaintiffs. This Article suggests that the Court's
latest major decision on the differences between civil and criminal contempt, International
Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, represents the high water mark in the Court's
emphasis on affording heightened procedural protections to alleged contemnors. This Article
observes that by implicitly expanding the definition of criminal contempt, the U.S. Supreme
Court has neglected to consider adequately plaintiffs' remedial entitlements and has unduly
restricted litigants from obtaining equitable relief promptly and reliably. This Article proposes
a return to the more traditional definitions of civil and criminal contempt coupled with
additional procedural reforms that would enhance the rights of both civil and criminal
contemnors while protecting plaintiffs' and courts' ability to have lawful decrees enforced. ,
For centuries Anglo-American courts have assumed an inherent power
to cite individuals for contempt for disobedience of court orders,
disruption of court proceedings, and other affronts to courts' dignity and
authority. Courts use contempt citations to compensate injured parties,
coerce reluctant defendants and witnesses, and punish defiant
individuals. Contempt sanctions normally involve either a fine, a term of
imprisonment, or both. Most recently, courts have levied or threatened to
levy contempt sanctions against the President of the United States,' a
recalcitrant witness in a proceeding to investigate possible presidential
* Professor of Law, DePal University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the
financial assistance of the DePaul University College of Law Summer Research Fund and the moral
support and encouragement offered by Dean Teree E. Foster. I am indebted also to Doug Rendleman
and Mark Weber for their insightful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this Article. And
finally, this work would not have been possible without the invaluable research assistance of DePaul
University College of Law students Terry Bowen, Angela Henderson, Patrick Jones, Matthew
Kidder, Paul McGrady, and Therese O'Brien.
1. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (imposing compensatory
contempt sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for President's perjury during
deposition in civil suit); Neil A. Lewis, Judge Orders Clinton to Pay $90,000 to Jones' Lawyers,
N.Y. Times, July 30, 1999, at A13 (noting that President was ordered to pay plaintiff's attorneys
$90,000 for extra work performed because of President's perjury).
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wrongdoing,2 striking commercial airline pilots,3 and one of America's
largest corporations.'
Over the years courts have struggled to find the exact parameters of
contempt, both procedurally and substantively. The result of this struggle
has been a cauldron of confusion, particularly concerning the appropriate
procedures to be followed when imposing a contempt sanction.' The U.S.
Supreme Court purportedly answered the procedural question in a recent
case, International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell.6
The Court in Bagwell held that fines imposed on a labor union for
disobeying a court order growing out of a coal miners' strike were
essentially criminal in nature and therefore required a criminal
proceeding before their imposition.7 The Court so held even though the
trial court had announced in advance that certain fines would be imposed
2. See United States v. McDougal (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 97 F.3d 1090, 1092 (8th Cir.
1996) (concerning witness subpoenaed by Independent Counsel who refused to testify before grand
jury regarding Whitewater investigation and was imprisoned indefinitely as coercive civil contempt).
3. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, No. 7:99-CV-025-X, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1376, at *5-7 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 1999) (ordering striking pilots' union to pay compensatory civil
contempt to airline).
4. According to news reports, Microsoft Corp. barely averted coercive contempt fines of
$1,000,000 per day for disobeying a preliminary injunction by agreeing to a settlement with the
Justice Department in the department's antitrust suit against the software manufacturer. See Julia
Angwin, Microsoft Makes Deal to Avoid Contempt Fines, S.F. Chron., Jan. 23, 1998, at Al; Pat
Widder, Microsoft Concedes, for Now But Fight over Internet Software Far from Over, Chi. Trib.,
Jan. 23, 1998, at 1.
5. Several commentators have remarked upon the murkiness of contempt jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the
Regulation ofIndirect Contempts, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1025, 1025 (1993) ("The literature on contempt of
court is unanimous on one point: the law is a mess."); Robert J. Martineau, Contempt of Court:
Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 677, 677
(1981) ("Few legal concepts have bedeviled courts, judges, lawyers and legal commentators more
than contempt of court."); Robert B. Patterson, Criminal Contempt: A Proposal for Reform
Providing "The Least Possible Power Adequate to the End Proposed," 17 S.D. L. Rev. 41, 62
(1972) ("Perhaps the only certainty in criminal contempt is that it is a theoretical and procedural
morass."); W. Gregory Rhodes, The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt in North
Carolina, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 1281, 1281 (1989) ("[A]ttempts to distinguish between civil and criminal
contempt have resulted in a legal morass, perplexing lawyers, judges, and commentators."). In 1890,
the leading contempt scholar of the era remarked that attempting to formulate a uniformly applicable
rule distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt was "impracticable." Stewart Rapalje, A
Treatise on Contempt 25 (1890). Seventy years later Ronald Goldfarb observed, "Time has proved
this evaluation to be an understatement. It is impossible." Ronald L. Goldfarb, The Contempt Power
52(1963).
6. 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
7. See id. at 837-38.
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if the union continued to violate the injunction.8 The trial court and the
Supreme Court of Virginia considered these fines to be in the nature of
coercive civil contempt because of their conditional. nature.9 Civil
contempts are prosecuted as part of the main equitable action and do not
require the heightened protections afforded a criminal defendant."°
The confusion about the distinction between civil and criminal
contempt has plagued the courts for decades." The U.S. Supreme Court's
latest foray into the debate in Bagwell represents a concession by the
Court that it is almost impossible to make a rational and meaningful
distinction between the two. In attempting to draw the line between
them, the Court pushed most substantial contempts into the criminal
category and thereby mandated the use of criminal procedures, as
opposed to traditional civil procedures, at the contempt hearing.
This Article posits that the historic efforts to distinguish between
criminal and civil contempts have failed to develop sufficiently the
policy rationale for the differing procedural requirements. Traditionally,
the purpose of the contempt has distinguished between the two types of
contempt. Civil contempt serves to benefit the plaintiff to the action by
providing compensation or coercion. Criminal contempt functions to
punish defendants for their disobedience of the court and the flouting of
the court's authority. Thus remedial or coercive contempts necessitated
only ordinary civil procedures whereas punitive contempts required
criminal procedures. Focusing on purpose, however, has not provided a
clear-cut answer to the problem of classification. A single contempt
citation can often serve more than one purpose,"2 and therefore the
question becomes whether criminal procedures should always be
required where the contempt is at least arguably punitive in nature.
This Article argues that by pushing the majority of what were
traditionally viewed as coercive civil contempts into the criminal
category, the U.S. Supreme Court has eviscerated lower courts' ability to
8. Seeid at 829-30.
9. See id at 825-26.
10. Seeid at 831.
11. Some courts have foundered more than others in their attempts to distinguish meaningfiully
between civil and criminal contempt: "In brief, civil contempt is the fhilure to obey a court order or
decree, while criminal contempt arises from the doing of some forbidden act." Exparte Powell, 883
S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
12. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Stevenson, 677 N.E.2d 551, 559-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that 90
day jail sentence had both coercive and punitive effects).
Vol. 75:345, 2000
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use contempt as an enforcement tool in aid of a litigant."' Almost all
published scholars on this topic have emphasized the need to protect the
due process rights of alleged contemnors. But although alleged
contemnors are certainly entitled to adequate procedures before the court
may impose sanctions, successful plaintiffs are equally deserving of an
effective remedy without undue delay. 4 Therefore, this Article posits a
remedial theory of contempt that attempts to balance alleged
contemnors' due process interests against plaintiffs' remedial interests.
This Article proposes five specific reforms that will protect the accused
from arbitrary and biased imposition of contempt fines while furthering
the judicial system's announced goal of providing relief to deserving
litigants. These reforms include: (1) statutory caps on criminal contempt
penalties; (2) creation of a jury-trial right in equity; (3) adoption of a
preference for non-contempt enforcement mechanism; (4) revival of the
traditional definition of coercive civil contempt; and (5) the immediate
appealability of coercive civil contempt sanctions.
Each reform by itself does not address all of the due process and
remedial concerns voiced by those critical of the current contempt
jurisprudence. But collectively these proposals respond to the most
pressing questions regarding protecting alleged contemnors' due process
rights, while at the same time ensuring that plaintiffs are able to achieve
the remedial satisfaction to which they are legally entitled. Although
each proposal could be enacted separate from the others, together they
strive toward a proper balance of plaintiffs' and defendants' interests
while recognizing the inherent potential for judicial bias in administering
contempt sanctions.
This Article begins with a review of the historic distinction between
criminal and civil contempt. It then traces the U.S. Supreme Court's
gradual embracing of heightened procedural protections for accused
criminal contemnors. Part II analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Bagwell and notes several difficulties with the majority opinion's
attempt to redraw the dividing line between civil and criminal contempt.
Furthermore, Part II explores the impact of the Bagwell decision on
subsequent state and federal appellate courts and reveals that lower
courts have tended either to ignore Bagwell completely or to distinguish
it in problematic cases. Part III examines the proposed approach to the
distinction between civil and criminal contempt and justifies that
13. See infra notes 359-66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 367-84 and accompanying text.
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approach in light of the competing interests of the parties, the court, and
the public. Part III also outlines several procedural and substantive
reforms that would safeguard the due process rights of contemnors while
effectuating the remedial rights of litigants.
I. WHY THE LAW OF CONTEMPT IS SO CONFUSING
A. The Modern Contempt Categories
By the twentieth century contempts were divided into at least four
categories: direct contempt, indirect criminal contempt, coercive civil
contempt, and remedial civil contempt. Direct contempts consisted of
disruptive or disrespectful behavior committed in the presence of the
court or so near the court's presence as to disrupt the administration of
justice. 5 Courts were thought to have inherent power to punish
summarily outlandish conduct that threatened to interfere with ongoing
proceedings or represented an affront to the court's dignity. 6
Both the court's inherent punitive power and the summary procedures
are still viewed as necessary to the effective administration of justice. 7 A
court must be able to punish shouting, cursing, interruptions, and other
disruptive behavior to keep control over the proceedings before it."
Furthermore, by punishing disrespectful comments or actions the court
reminds those in the courtroom of the dignity not only of the judge's
position but also of the principles being administered. 9
15. See Catholic Social Servs. v. Howard, 666 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
16. English scholars have questioned the legitimacy of the English courts' assumed power to
punish individuals summarily for criminal contempt See Sir John C. Fox, The History of Contempt
of Court 34-44 (1927); Christopher J. Miller, Contempt of Court 20-23 (1976). The practice of
summary punishment became firmly established in the early nineteenth century in Great Britain on
the basis of the 1802 publication of a decision by Justice Wilmot of the Court of King's Bench.
Wilmot's opinion assumed that the court possessed the authority since time immemorial to punish
both in-court and out-of-court contempts in a summary proceeding without a right to jury trial. See
Fox, supra, at 5-7.
17. The U.S. Supreme Court recently noted, "Longstanding precedent confirms the power of
courts to find summary contempt and impose punishment." Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 987
(1997).
18. In justifying summary adjudication of direct contempt, one court observed that "unless such
an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court is not instantly suppressed and punished,
demoralization of the court's authority may follow." State v. Conliff, 401 N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ohio
1978).
19. See In re Contempt of Morris, 674 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
349
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Direct contempt even after Bagwell can still be punished
contemporaneously by means of summary proceedings." Immediately
after the offending action, the judge can make a finding that an
individual is in contempt of court and can order punishment by a fine, a
jail term, or both. Although direct contempt is undoubtedly criminal in
nature, a full-blown criminal trial is thought unnecessary for two reasons.
First, criminal-type protections are directed largely at redressing the
imbalance of resources between the state and the defendant in the judicial
process to ensure that the truth emerges. In instances of direct contempt,
the judge presumably saw or heard the contumacious conduct and need
not adduce and weigh additional evidence.2' More importantly, however,
the necessity for an orderly process dictates the abbreviated nature of the
proceedings. The judge should not be required to interrupt the ongoing
proceeding to hold a separate criminal trial on the issue of contempt.
Even a criminal trial deferred to the end of the present proceeding would
undercut the court's ability to maintain decorum.22
Although the procedural requirements for direct contempts are fairly
well established, this type of contempt still produces its own set of
litigable issues. Contemnors question whether the alleged contempt
occurred in the presence of the court,23 whether the conduct at issue
constituted an affront to the court's authority or dignity,24 and whether
the court imposed an excessive punishment.25 These issues point towards
20. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 838 (1994) ("Our
holding... leaves unaltered the longstanding authority of judges to adjudicate direct contempts
summarily...."); see also United States v. Winter, 70 F.3d 655, 663 (1st Cir. 1995).
21. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a) allows a judge to punish a contempt summarily only
if the judge "certifies that the judge saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it
was committed in the actual presence of the court."
22. Even Justice Frankfurter, who generally disfavored summary proceedings, acknowledged
their occasional necessity: "When... action is necessary for the decorous continuance of a pending
trial, disposition by another judge of a charge of contempt is impracticable. Interruption for a hearing
before a separate judge would disrupt the trial and thus achieve the illicit purpose of a contemnor."
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 37 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
23. See In re Parker, 663 N.E.2d 671, 674-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Federal Land Bank Ass'n v.
Walton, 651 N.E.2d 1048, 1050-51 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Varley v. Varley, 934 S.W.2d 659, 664
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
24. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698 (1974); People v. Minor, 667 N.E.2d 538, 542-
43 (II1. App. Ct. 1996); State v. Martin, 555 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn. 1996); State v. Turner, 914
S.W.2d 951, 961 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
25. See, e.g., Scaife v. Associated Air Ctr., Inc., 100 F.3d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 1996); Tyler v. City
of Milwaukee, 740 F.2d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1984); City of Chicago v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union,
425 N.E.2d 1071, 1078 (Il1. Ct. App. 1981).
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the source of the law's basic uneasiness about the contempt power-the
possibility that a court may abuse its authority to punish an individual to
whom it simply has an aversion.26 Appellate courts are often reluctant to
second-guess a trial court's handling of a potentially disruptive
situation. 7 Yet there remains the possibility that a trial judge,
unsympathetic to a particular party or attorney, may use the contempt
power to stifle that individual's expression in the courtroom. 8
Indirect contempts-those occurring outside the court's presence-do
not present the same threat to an ongoing judicial proceeding nor do they
present the same potential for the immediate suppression of a party's
expression while before the court. But they do raise the same specter of
abuse of judicial power: the same judge who issues an injunction may
later be called upon to enforce that injunction against a disobedient
defendant. In cases involving equitable remedies, the trial judge often
acts as both lawgiver and law enforcer without the aid of a jury.
Like direct contempts, indirect contempts can be either civil or
criminal. Indirect civil contempts are generally divided into two
categories: remedial and coercive. Remedial civil contempts serve to
compensate plaintiffs for damages suffered because of the defendant's
disobedience of a court order.29 For example, a court might order a
defendant not to cut down a one-hundred-year-old oak tree, which the
court has determined is located on the plaintiff's land just over the
defendant's property line. In response, the defendant violates the
injunction by cutting down the oak tree. The plaintiff then seeks
26. Justice Black once described a court's power to try direct contempts summarily "'as perhaps,
nearest akin to despotic power of any power existing under our form of government.' Green v.
United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193-94 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting State ex rel. Ashbaugh v.
Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 193, 194-95 (Wis. 1887)). Our justice system also eschews in general the
idea of punishment without the availability of ajury trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
27. "Whether [summary criminal contempt] is necessary in a particular case is a matter [Rule 42]
wisely leaves to the discretion of the trial court." United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316-17
(1975).
28. Arguing for the availability of jury trials in criminal contempt cases, Justice Black described
the all-too-human failings ofjudges: "Judges are not essentially different from other government
officials. Fortunately they remain human even after assuming their judicial duties. Like the rest of
mankind they may be affected from time to time by pride and passion, by pettiness and bruised
feelings, by improper understanding or by excessive zeal." Green, 356 U.S. at 198 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
29. In some states compensatory damages are not allowed as part of a civil contempt proceeding.
See, e.g., Atassi v. Atassi, 470 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). For an overview of
compensatory civil contempt, see generally Doug Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiff's
Remedy When Defendant Violates an Injunction, 1980 U. MI. L.F. 971.
Vol. 75:345, 2000
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compensation for the loss of the tree through the imposition of remedial
civil contempt.
Remedial civil contempt is merely another form of compensatory
damages, and plaintiffs must ordinarily prove their pecuniary loss as they
would in any legal action for damages.30 In the oak tree example, the
plaintiff would have the burden to show either the replacement cost of
the tree or the diminution of the fair market value of the land because of
the tree's destruction.3' Remedial civil contempt is prosecuted as part of
the main action in equity. Defendants are entitled to the ordinary due
process (with the exception of a jury trial) afforded parties in a civil
action32 and no more-for example, the standard of proof is usually
preponderance of the evidence.33
Coercive civil contempt, like remedial civil contempt, exists primarily
for the benefit of the plaintiff. It is designed to force a reluctant
defendant to comply with a court order.34 For example, if the court orders
the defendant to disclose the whereabouts of his child and he refuses, the
court might impose a per diem fine or indeterminate prison term to
induce the defendant to comply with the order.35 In the case of either a
daily fine or open-ended prison sentence, the defendant can end the
penalty by complying with the court order. Thus it is said that defendants
incarcerated in this situation have the "keys to their prison in their own
pockets."'36
30. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 933 S.W.2d 437,449 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
31. Plaintiffs seeking remedial civil contempt often find it difficult to prove their damages.
Normally, an injunction is issued only where the remedy at law-that is, damages-is inadequate.
Inadequacy of the legal remedy frequently translates into an inability to calculate damages precisely.
An old oak tree on a residential parcel may be essentially irreplaceable in the marketplace, and the
loss of value to the land without the tree may be hard to ascertain. Professor Rendleman refers to this
puzzle as the "irony" of compensatory contempt. Rendleman, supra note 29, at 985.
32. See In re Marriage of Lamutt, 881 P.2d 445, 446-47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Mower County
Human Servs. v. Swancutt, 551 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. 1996).
33. See In re Harvey, 464 S.E.2d 34, 36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Sinaiko v. Sinaiko, 664 A.2d 1005,
1009 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). In some jurisdictions the burden of proof is clear and convincing
evidence. See New York State Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1351 (2d Cir. 1989);
Carroll v. Detty, 681 N.E.2d 1383, 1384 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
34. See Landingham v. Landingham, 685 So. 2d 946, 951 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1996); People v.
Shukovsky, 538 N.E.2d 444, 447 (I11. 1988); Lynch v. Lynch, 677 A.2d 584, 589 (Md. 1996);
Richland Township v. Prodex, Inc., 646 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
35. See, e.g., Sanders v. Shepard, 645 N.E.2d 900, 903 (III. 1995) (concerning confinement of
contemnor in prison until he agreed to disclose his child's location).
36. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
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Because the purpose is to assist the plaintiff in obtaining enforcement
of the court order, coercive contempt has always been considered civil in
nature. As such, it mandates only an ordinary civil hearing, and it falls
away if the underlying order is vacated or the parties settle.37 Because
coercive contempt is imposed as an adjunct to an action in equity,
equitable procedures are followed, and no jury trial is available.38
Finally, indirect contempt can be criminal in nature. Indirect criminal
contempt like direct contempt serves to vindicate the court's authority
and to punish defendants who disregard that authority. It usually consists
of a fixed fine or fixed term of imprisonment. Unlike civil contempt, it
requires full-blown criminal procedures,39 including the privilege against
self-incrimination, 4 right to counsel,4 the presumption of innocence,42
proof of the violation beyond a reasonable doubt,43 and the right to ajury
37. One court has outlined the necessary procedural requirements for imposition of coercive civil
contempt
(1) [T] he court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person;
(2) a clear definition ofthe acts to be performed;
(3) notice of the acts to be performed and a reasonable time within which to comply;
(4) an application by the party seeking enforcement giving the specific grounds for complaint;
(5) a hearing, after due notice, to give the nonperforming party an opportunity to show
compliance or the reasons for failure;
(6) a formal determination by the court of the failure to comply, and if so, whether conditional
confinement will aid compliance;
(7) an opportunity for the nonperforming party to show inability to comply despite a good faith
effort; and
(8) the contemnor's ability to gain release through compliance or a good faith effort to comply.
Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d 212,216-17 (Minn. 1968).
38. See In re Department of Hous. Preservation & Dev. v. Deka Realty Corp., 620 N.Y.S.2d 837,
843-44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Richland Township, 646 A.2d at 654-55. But see Johansen v. State,
491 P.2d 759, 762 (Alaska 1971) (requiring jury trial before coercive confinement).
39. Despite a line of U.S. Supreme Court cases equating criminal contempts with other criminal
offenses for the purposes of determining alleged contemnors' due process rights, some states
continue to hold that indirect criminal contempt is sui generis and does not necessarily mandate full
criminal procedural protections. See, e.g., State er rel. Chassaing v. Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 573, 579
n.3 (Mo. 1994) ("The United States Supreme Court has never extended all the protections afforded a
criminal defendant to an alleged contemnor.").
40. See In re Marriage of Gibbs, 645 N.E.2d 507, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 260 S.E.2d 222,225 (Va. 1979).
41. See Ingebrethsen v. Ingebrethsen, 661 A.2d 403, 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
42. See In re Marriage of Hunt, 933 S.W.2d 437,448 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
43. See Lindman v. Ellis, 658 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fia. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Attorney Gen. v.
Montoya, 968 P.2d 784, 789 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998); Poston v. Poston, 502 S.E.2d 86, 89 (S.C. 1998);
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trial for serious sanctions." Criminal contempt is also prosecuted
separately from the underlying equitable action and can be appealed
immediately." Unlike civil contempt, it requires a showing of willful
disobedience of the court order.46
A single defendant can be subject to all three types of indirect
contempt sanctions as part of the same suit. For instance, in the oak tree
hypothetical, suppose the defendant were ordered not to cut down the
tree and also to remove his construction equipment from the plaintiff's
land. In violation of the injunction, the defendant cuts down the tree and
refuses to remove his equipment. The plaintiff could seek remedial civil
contempt to compensate her for the loss of her tree and coercive civil
contempt to force the defendant to comply with the part of the injunction
ordering him to remove his equipment. The remedial contempt should
approximate the value of the lost oak tree. The coercive contempt would
likely involve some sort of daily fine until the defendant removed his
equipment.47 Also, the court could refer the defendant's violation to the
prosecutor, who might choose to bring an action for criminal contempt.
The criminal contempt could consist of either a fine or a term of
imprisonment or both, depending on the circumstances.
State ex rel. Richardson v. Richardson, No. 01-A-01-9706-CV-00274, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 638,
at *19 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1998).
44. The defendant can also be pardoned for a criminal contempt. See Ex parte Grossman, 267
U.S. 87, 122 (1925). Furthermore, the government cannot appeal an acquittal. See United States v.
Lynch, 162 F.3d 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Bittner, 11 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1926). The jury-trial right is afforded only for more serious criminal
contempts where the actual penalty imposed is more than six months in prison or a substantial fine.
See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-76 (1975). What constitutes a "substantial fine" varies
depending on the financial resources of the contemnor. See Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 228 n.13
(5th Cir. 1998) (holding $75,000 contempt fine against individual "manifestly non-petty"); United
States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 665 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding $100,000
fine against organization triggers right to jury trial and below that level court should consider
whether fine will have "significant financial impact" on organization); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that contempt fines on individual in excess of
$500 require jury trial); see also Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal
Jury Trial, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 133, 157-59.
45. Civil contempts are appealable at the conclusion of the main action or whenever there is a
final appealable order. See In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 1996); Seattle Northwest
Sec., Corp. v. SDG Holding Co., 61 Wash. App. 725, 732, 812 P.2d 488, 493 (1991).
46. See People v. Minor, 667 N.E.2d 538, 542 (III. App. Ct. 1996). Willfulness normally involves
the defendant's deliberate choice to disobey the decree, frequently with a "bad faith disregard for
authority and the law." Forte v. Forte, 309 S.E.2d 729, 730 (N.C. CL App. 1983).
47. It would likely be counterproductive to put the defendant in jail to coerce compliance since
the removal of the equipment might require his personal labors.
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This brief overview of the various types of contempt suggests a
certain neatness to the categories that does not exist in reality. Lower
courts often mislabel the contempt sanctions that they impose, for
example, denominating a fine coercive when it is really punitive.48 The
mislabeling by itself is not fatal, but when the court then uses ordinary
civil procedures to impose what is essentially a criminal penalty, it
violates the defendant's constitutional rights.
The lower courts' confusion is readily understandable.49 Coercive civil
contempt and criminal contempt tend to run together. The imposition of
successive criminal contempt fines on recalcitrant defendants may
convince them that compliance is a cruel necessity and thus have a
coercive effect."0 On the other hand, coercive civil contempt-for
example, in the form of an indeterminate jail sentence-may tend to
have a punitive effect on a defendant who cannot"' or simply will not
comply with the court order.
Particularly troublesome for the courts have been prospective fine
schedules for contempt. Sometimes courts, as in the Bagwell case, have
told defendants in advance of their disobedience that if they violate the
court order, the court will levy a fine of a specified amount.52 When the
defendants subsequently violate the order, the courts have then imposed
the announced fine. Many lower courts consider such fines to be coercive
civil contempt analogous to traditional per diem fines, and therefore
48. See United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 626 (9th Cir. 1980); Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham,
403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968).
49. California adds to the confusion by denominating as "civil contempt' penalties that are clearly
criminal in nature and then affording most of the criminal procedural protections in proceedings in
which these penalties are assessed. See People v. Gonzalez, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 235, 239-40 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995), rev'don other grounds, 910 P.2d 1366 (Cal. 1996).
50. See, e.g., Warner v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 906 P.2d 707, 709 (Nev. 1995) (noting
coercive and punitive effects of contempt sanction).
51. Inability to comply is a defense to an injunction, but a court could conceivably misjudge a
defendant's ability to comply or that ability might diminish over time. See Drake v. National Bank of
Commerce, 190 SE. 302, 308 (Va. 1937) (stating that court disbelieved defendant's unimpeached
testimony that he could not comply with order); Owen M. Fiss & Doug Rendleman, Injunctions
1083-97 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing injustices sometimes produced by interminable coercive
sentences). In some cases courts have refused to excuse the defendant's professed inability to
comply. See Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 61 (Cal. 1998) (holding that defendant who failed
to comply with order to pay child support could be adjudged in contempt where his noncompliance
resulted from willful failure to obtain employment).
52. See Hawaii Pub. Employee Relations Bd. v. United Pub. Workers, 667 P.2d 783, 795 (Haw.
1983).
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afford the defendant only an ordinary civil proceeding.53 Some appellate
courts have disagreed, arguing that at the time the fine is imposed, it is
backward-looking and therefore punitive and not coercive. 4 It was this
issue that the U.S. Supreme Court confronted in Bagwell.
B. The Historic Evolution of Contempt Procedures
The history of contempt procedures55 reveals an ongoing and overt
tension between the view of contempt as an inherent and necessary
weapon of courts to enforce their orders and the fear that courts will
misuse their authority to punish unpopular individuals or groups.56 A
review of the U.S. Supreme Court precedents and federal statutes on this
topic reflects this tension.
1. The Post-Revolutionary Law of Contempt: Early Signs of Distrust
of Judicial Power
Although there is much debate about the origins and nature of the
contempt power in the early English and American courts,57 it is clear
53. See Marks v. Vehlow, 671 P.2d 473, 480 (Idaho 1983); Mahoney v. Commonwealth, 612
N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (Mass. 1993).
54. See Commonwealth v. Charlett, 391 A.2d 1296, 1300 (Pa. 1978); In re Schei, No. 37441-9-I,
1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 2019, at *13-14 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1997).
55. For a comprehensive discussion of contempt generally, see Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court:
A Survey, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 183 (1971).
56. The United States has always had a rich tradition of civil disobedience dating back to pre-
Revolutionary times and reaching the present day. Dissidents have protested and refused to obey
laws that denied religious liberty, promoted slavery, excluded women from the political process,
discriminated against African-Americans and other minorities, supported the Vietnam War, and
allowed women to have abortions. In many cases protesters suffered fines, imprisonment, or both for
the exercise of their views. See generally Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice (Hugo Adam
Bedau ed., 1969); Civil Disobedience in America (David R. Weber ed., 1978); Robert T. Hall, The
Morality of Civil Disobedience (1971).
Many of the contempt cases involve contemnors who strongly believed that the court order
directed against them sprang from unjust or oppressive laws. Perhaps the paradigmatic case is
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 310 (1967), in which the defendants declared their
intention to disobey the state court injunction because it was "'raw tyranny under the guise of
maintaining law and order."' Given the almost accepted tradition of such behavior, one might
question to what extent the law should punish or coerce recalcitrant individuals motivated by a
sincere desire to change what they perceive as an unjust system.
57. Compare Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 161,
170 (1908) (asserting that until nineteenth century chancery courts used fines and imprisonment
purely to coerce compliance with court orders, not punish), with Note, Civil and Criminal Contempt
Washington Law Review Vol. 75:345,2000
that post-Revolutionary American courts claimed an inherent authority to
enforce their orders and punish contemnors through monetary fines and
prison terms. 8 There is some evidence that even colonial American
courts imposed sanctions on defiant individuals equivalent to modem
direct criminal contempt and coercive civil contempt. 9 Throughout the
early days of the Republic, courts recognized that contempt was essential
to preserving the court's integrity and to insuring respect and obedience
of court decrees.'°
At the same time, judges have always been aware on some level of the
enormous potential for abuse inherent in the contempt power.6
Legislative regulation of the contempt power commenced almost
immediately following ratification of the Constitution. In the Judiciary
Act of 1789, Congress purported to grant the federal courts "the
power ... to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said
courts, all contempts of authority in any case or hearing before
in the Federal Courts, 57 Yale L.J. 83, 90-91 (1947) (noting that before 1869 civil contempt did not
exist; all contempts were criminal).
58. See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873) (holding that power to
punish for contempt is inherent in Article Ell courts); Spalding v. New York ex rel. Backus, 45 U.S.
(4 How.) 21 (1846); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342);
Olmstead v. The Active, 18 F. Cas. 680 (D. Pa. 1803) (No. 10,503A); Garretson v. Cole, 1 H. & J.
370 (Md. 1802).
59. See, e.g., 9 William W. Hening, The Statutes at Large (Virginia) 414 (1818) (reprinting 1777
Virginia statute allowing court to commit to jail indefinitely any person who refused to give
testimony); J. Hammond Trumball, Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, From 1665-78, at
60 (1852) (noting court could punish for contemptuous or disorderly behavior). For an overview of
colonial contempt laws, see United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681,701-24 (1964).
60. See Voss v. Luke, 28 F. Cas. 1302, 1302 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 17,014); Johnston v.
Commonwealth, 4 Ky. 598,602 (1809); State v. Trumbull, 4 NJ.L. 161, 162 (1818).
61. Many courts have cited as a caution to judges imposing contempt penalties language in an
early U.S. Supreme Court case, Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,231 (1821), to the effect
that judges should exercise "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." See, e.g.,
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990); United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444,
454 (2d Cir. 1988); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 935 F. Supp. 1452, 1463 (D. Colo. 1996). In fact,
the Court in Anderson was considering whether the House of Representatives, not a court, could cite
an individual for contempt, and the Court held that it could and extolled in no uncertain terms the
absolute necessity for the contempt power.
The argument [against recognizing Congressional contempt power] obviously leads to the total
annihilation of the power of the House of Representatives to guard itself from contempts, and
leaves it exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy,
may meditate against it... [Tihat such an assembly should not possess the power to suppress
rudeness, or repel insult, is a supposition too wild to be suggested.
Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 228-29.
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same.... ,,62 In 1831, in response to popular antagonism to judicial
suppression of published criticism of the courts through use of the
contempt power,6' Congress enacted restrictions on judicial punishment
of constructive contempts in a statute that remains the principal
legislation definition of contempt." It allowed courts to punish only
misbehavior in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice, disobedience of court writs and orders, and
contemptuous conduct by court officers.65 These restrictions reduced the
courts' use of the contempt power to punish out-of-court criticism of
judges and judicial proceedings."
At the end of the nineteenth century, the necessity view of contempt
among the judiciary perhaps reached its high water mark.67 Courts
viewed themselves as having free rein to punish disobedience of their
62. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
63. The public outcry against the contempt power stemmed from the actions of Judge James H.
Peck, who was impeached for summarily punishing an attorney for contempt for writing an article
critical of the judge's conduct and rulings in several land-grant cases. The attorney persuaded
Congress to impeach Peck, who was acquitted by a vote of 22-21 after a year of hearings. Although
Peck was acquitted, the public sentiment in favor of freedom of speech and press resulted in the
enactment of the 1831 statute. See Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 20-21.
64. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 401).
65. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 401). The
modem version of this statute states:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its
discretion, such contempt of its authority and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
ofjustice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994). Many states have used the federal act as the core of their own contempt
statutes. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-1-8 (1995); Idaho Code § 7-601 (1998); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 476.110
(West 1987); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-456 (Michie 1996).
66. See Exparte Poulson, 19 F. Cas. 1205, 1208 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1835) (No. 11,350) (holding that
misbehavior in presence of or near court required actual physical, not merely causal, proximity). The
U.S. Supreme Court, however, in a controversial decision in 1918 held that a newspaper could be
punished for contempt for a publication tending to obstruct the administration ofjustice regardless of
the publication's or the newspaper's geographic proximity to the court. See Toledo Newspaper Co.
v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918).
67. While acknowledging the potential for abuse of the contempt power, the U.S. Supreme Court
observed in 1888: "That power cannot be denied [the courts], without inviting or causing such
obstruction to the orderly and impartial administration of justice as would endanger the rights and
safety of the entire community." Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 309 (1888).
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orders as well as disruptive courtroom behavior. Although out-of-court
contempts required a separate adversarial hearing,69 courts were not
bound by the Bill of Rights protections afforded the typical criminal
defendant, 0 and appeal rights were strictly limited.7 Criminal contempt
was regarded as sui generis, neither criminal nor civil in nature.72
2. The Effect of the Labor Movement on Contempt Jurisprudence at
the Turn of the Century
By the start of the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court began
voicing its concerns over the unbridled use of the contempt power by
lower federal courts. No doubt a large part of this concern stemmed from
the excesses practiced on labor unions under the guise of judicial
authority.73 The lower federal courts came to be widely regarded as the
captives of industry in its struggle with the burgeoning labor
movement.74 Injunctions and contempt penalties were used to stifle
strikes and labor organizing at their inception.' The antipathy towards
68. "[Ior direct contempts committed in the face of the ourt ... the offender may, in its
discretion, be instantly apprehended and immediately imprisoned, without trial or issue, and without
other proof than its actual trial knowledge of what ocurred... ." Ie at 313.
69. See, e.g., In re Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889); Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289.
70. See Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 39 (1890) (holding that Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause does not prohibit state courts from imposing sanctions for indirect
criminal contempt in summary proceedings with no jury-trial right).
71. At common law, criminal contempts were unreviewable by appeal or writ of error. See
Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 335 (1904). On occasion, the Court reviewed contempts
through the use of habeas corpus and certiorari. See id
72. See id at 326; O'Neal v. United States, 190 U.S. 36,38 (1903).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Railway Employees' Dep't of AFL, 283 F. 479 (N.D. Ii. 1922);
United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (N.D. Ill. 1894); Toledo A.A. & N.M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co.,
54 F. 746 (N.D. Ohio 1893).
74. See Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction 5-46 (1930).
75. One British jurist observed the effect of class schisms on the outcome in litigated labor
disputes:
mhe habits you are trained in, the people with whom you mix, lead to your having a certain
class of ideas of such a nature that, when you have to deal with other ideas, you do not give as
sound and accurate judgments as you would wish. This is one of the great difficulties at present
with Labour. Labour says, "Where are your impartial Judges? They all move in the same circle
as the employers, and they are all educated and nursed in the same ideas as the employers. How
can a labour man or a trade unionist get impartial justice?" It is very difficult sometimes to be
sure that you have put yourself into a thoroughly impartial position between two disputants, one
of your own class and one not of your class.
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the use of judicial power to snuff out workers' protests culminated in
Congress' passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,76 which essentially
eliminated the federal district courts' ability to enjoin strikes."'
Thus the Court began its slow voyage towards recognition of criminal
contempt as a crime entitling the accused to the full extent of criminal
procedural protections. This voyage encompassed both indirect and
direct contempts, although the issues were somewhat different for each.
The Court over time seemingly became convinced of the underlying
similarities between criminal contempt and ordinary felonies and
misdemeanors. Merely because a court, rather than the legislature,
defines the parameters of acceptable behavior and the penalties for
deviance does not alter the fact that accused criminal contemnors face the
possibility of substantial loss of liberty and property at the hands of what
is essentially a government prosecution. As such, alleged contemnors
should be entitled to all of the safeguards afforded criminal defendants
under the Bill of Rights. In many respects, the potential for unjustified or
arbitrary punishment is greater in the criminal contempt arena than in
other areas of criminal law because the transgression alleged involves an
affront to judicial authority. Any judge, even one who did not issue the
injunction that was allegedly disobeyed, will undoubtedly be sensitive to
such affronts.
3. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.: The Pivotal Contempt Case
Until Bagwell
In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co.78 marked the Court's first definitive statement that
criminal contempts could not be tried in ordinary civil proceedings. It
Lord Justice Scrutton, An Address to the University Law Society, reprinted in The Work of the
Commercial Courts, 1 Cambridge L.J. 6, 8 (1921).
76. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which was passed in 1932, states:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary
or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit
any person or persons participating in or interested in such dispute.., from ... [c]easing or
refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment ....
Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 104(a)
(1994)).
77. For a discussion of the history and purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see Boys Market,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 250-52 (1970). Because of federal preemption doctrine,
the Norris-LaGuardia Act also has the effect of eliminating state court jurisdiction in labor disputes.
78. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
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also formulated definitions of criminal and civil contempt that guided
lower courts throughout most of the remainder of the century. In
Gompers, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had instituted a
boycott against the Bucks Stove and Range Co. because of alleged unfair
labor practices.79 The company in turn sought and obtained an injunction
against the AFL and certain of its officers restraining them from assisting
the boycott or publishing the company's name on an "unfair" or "we
don't patronize" list."0 Several months later at the company's instigation
the individual defendants were found guilty of contempt for conspiring
to continue the boycott by publishing statements that the company was
on the "unfair" list, and they were sentenced to prison terms ranging
from six to twelve months."
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendants attacked both the
injunction and the contempt citations. Quickly rejecting the defendants'
substantive attack on the injunction as an unconstitutional restraint on
free speech, the Court viewed the injunction not as an abridgement of
speech, but as a prohibition against continuing a boycott that caused
irreparable harm. 2 Because equity traditionally has the power to prevent
actions that threaten damage to property interests, the injunction was
proper.8
3
But the Court was not so forgiving of the contempt citations. The
Court stated that the procedures used by the trial court must match the
type of sanction imposed." Criminal contempts require at least some of
the aspects of criminal procedure, such as the presumption of innocence,
the proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the privilege against
self-incrimination.s The Court also catalogued several other important
procedural distinctions between civil and criminal contempt, including
appealability, 6 the identity of the prosecuting party,87 and the surviv-
ability of the sanction. 8
79. See id at 436.
80. Seeki.
81. See id at 435.
82. See id at 437-38.
83. Seeki.
84. See id at 449.
85. See id at 444.
86. Defendants enjoyed only limited rights of appeal from criminal contempts, with the appellate
court restricted to reviewing only questions of law. On the other hand, civil contempts could be
appealed as part ofthe main action and reconsidered in their entirety on appeal. See i. at 441.
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Thus, distinguishing between civil and criminal contempts is an
essential task for the trial and appellate courts. The Court in Gompers
stated that the "character and purpose" of the contempt sanction often
determine its classification. 9 Civil contempt benefits the plaintiff either
by providing compensation for damages or by coercing defendant's
compliance.9" Criminal contempt vindicates the judicial authority by
punishing the defendant for past disobedience.9 The Court acknow-
ledged that the two forms of sanction overlap in the sense that each
incidentally serves the purpose of the other:
[I]f the case is civil and the punishment is purely remedial, there is
also a vindication of the court's authority. On the other hand, if the
proceeding is for criminal contempt and the imprisonment is solely
punitive, to vindicate the authority of the law, the complainant may
also derive some incidental benefit from the fact that such
punishment tends to prevent a repetition of the disobedience.9'
But the Court also emphasized that despite these incidental side effects,
each form of contempt retains its essential character.93
The Court then proceeded to create what may be characterized as an
overly simplistic categorization of contempts based on the wording of the
underlying decree. If the decree is mandatory and requires the defendant
to perform an affirmative act, such as conveying a parcel of property,
then the corresponding contempt for disobedience is coercive civil.' If
the decree is prohibitory and forbids the defendant from engaging in
certain acts, then any sanction imposed must be criminal.95 This link
between mandatory orders and coercive civil contempt and between
prohibitory orders and criminal contempt endures to this day and was
87. Criminal contempts are prosecuted in the government's name independently of the original
equitable action. However, the party plaintiff brings the motion for civil contempt sanctions as part
of its equitable case against the defendant. See id, at 446.
88. If the original injunction is found invalid for any reason or the parties agree to settle the
underlying litigation, civil contempt falls away but criminal contempt survives. See id. at 451.
89. See id. at441.
90. See id. at 442-43.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 443.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 442.
95. See id. at 442-43.
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implicitly adopted by the majority opinion in Bagwell, the U.S. Supreme
Court's most recent decision on civil and criminal contempt.96
The Court in Gompers ultimately determined that because the prison
terms were fixed and were imposed for past disobedience of the
injunction, they had to be characterized as criminal.97 However, the trial
court had used only ordinary civil procedures at the contempt hearing."
Given this procedural defect, the criminal convictions were overturned."
In dictum, the Court noted that civil contempt was not available at this
point because the parties had settled the main action."t°
The Gompers case reappeared before the Court three years later after
the original case was remanded and after the lower court had appointed a
committee that prosecuted the defendants for criminal contempt.' 1 The
defendants interposed the three-year criminal statute of limitations as a
defense, but the lower court ruled it inapplicable to criminal contempt."
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes held that criminal contempt did
fall within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to criminal
offenses.0 3 Even though those accused of criminal contempt had no right
to jury trial, Holmes stated that criminal contempt was a crime in every
meaningful sense of the word:
These contempts are infractions of the law, visited with punishment
as such. If such acts are not criminal, we are in error as to the most
fundamental characteristic of crimes as that word has been
understood in English speech. So truly are they crimes that it seems
to be proved that in the early law they were punished only by the
usual criminal procedure."
96. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. S21, 827-29 (1994).
97. See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444.
98. The Court noted that the party plaintiff instituted the contempt proceedings and that the court
obviously treated those proceedings as part of the original equitable action. See a at 445.
99. The Court left open the possibility that the lower court could still institute a separate
prosecution for criminal contempt against the defendants. See Ed at 451-52.
100. See id
fOl. See Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604,606 (1914).
102. See id.
103. Seei at612.
104. Id at610-11.
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4. The Supreme Court's Leisurely Procedural Criminalization of
Contempt
After Gompers, the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition of greater
procedural protections in criminal contempt proceedings continued in a
careful and often uneven manner. Eleven years after the first Gompers
decision, the Court held that when a trial court imposed a mixed civil and
criminal contempt, the criminal aspects fixed the character of the
contempt for purposes of appellate review.'0 5 This holding allowed
contemnors to appeal the contempt immediately as opposed to being
forced to wait until the conclusion of the equitable action. But two years
later in an opinion by Justice McReynolds, the Court reiterated its
position that criminal contempt is sui generis and does not constitute a
criminal prosecution within the Sixth Amendment or within "common
understanding."'' 6
Almost immediately there followed three cases in which the U.S.
Supreme Court indicated its unease with the lack of procedural
protections given to criminal contemnors. In Michaelson v. United
States,0 7 the Court held that Congress could constitutionally grant jury
trial rights in certain types of criminal contempts' A portion of the
Clayton Act, passed in 1914, provided that in the federal district courts
the accused had the right to trial by jury when the action constituting the
criminal contempt was also a criminal offense under state or federal
law."° The Court stated the statutory provision was clearly within
Congress' constitutional power to regulate the inferior federal courts."'
Although the imposition of contempt was undoubtedly an inherent power
of the federal courts, Congress still had the authority to regulate it in
limited ways, such as granting a jury trial right for criminal contempts
that also constitute crimes."'
In two opinions by Chief Justice Taft, the Court continued its gradual
acceptance of the appropriateness of putting criminal contempt on a
105. See Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 110-11 (1922). Once the appellate court had
jurisdiction over the contempt, it could review all of the sanctions, civil and criminal. See id. at 111.
In this case, the Court of Appeals had reversed the punitive portion of the contempt. See id. at 109.
106. See Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1924).
107. 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
108. See id. at 67.
109. See Clayton Act, §§ 21-22, 38 Stat. 738 (1914).
110. See Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 65-66.
111. See id.
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procedural par with other criminal prosecutions. For the first time, the
Court adverted to the dangers of biased and arbitrary imposition of
contempt sanctions. In Ex parte Grossman,' 2 the Court held that the
President had the power to pardon criminal contempts, rejecting
arguments that a Presidential pardon power unduly interfered with the
courts' inherent ability to compel obedience to their orders.' 3 Justice
Taft observed that the contempt power, while necessary, was vulnerable
to judicial abuse:
[I]t is... exercised without the restraining influence of a jury and
without many of the guaranties which the bill of rights offers to
protect the individual against unjust conviction. Is it unreasonable
to provide for the possibility that the personal element may
sometimes enter into a summary judgment pronounced by a judge
who thinks his authority is flouted or denied? May it not be fairly
said that in order to avoid possible mistake, undue prejudice or
needless severity, the chance of pardon should exist at least as
much in favor of a person convicted by a judge without a jury as in
favor of one convicted in ajury trial?" 4
Taft carried forward this theme in Cooke v. United States,"5 also
decided in 1925. An attorney had been convicted of criminal contempt
for writing a letter to a judge in a pending case accusing him of bias." 6
Although Chief Justice Taft agreed that the letter in its tone and wording
was contemptuous, he found that the lower court had failed to afford the
attorney due process in finding him in contempt."7 Because the contempt
was not committed in open court, summary proceedings were not
warranted." 8 The accused was entitled to have advance notice of the
charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to defend against
them." 9 Opportunity to defend included "the assistance of counsel, if
112. 267 U.S. 87(1925).
113. See a at 122.
114. Id
115. 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
116. The attorney stated in his letter that before the trial began, "I had believed that your honor
was big enough and broad enough to overcome the personal prejudice against the defendant... but I
find that in this fond hope I was mistaken. .. ." Id at 520.
117. See idat538.
118. The lower court had the defendant-attorney arrested and brought to court without any
advance notice of the charges against him. The court refused him the opportunity to retain and
consult counsel or to call witnesses in his defense. See icL at 537-38.
119. See idat537.
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requested, and the right to call witnesses to give testimony, relevant
either to the issue of complete exculpation or in extenuation of the
offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed."' 2 °
The next major U.S. Supreme Court case involving contempt United
States v. United Mine Workers,'2' marked a retreat in the recognition of
procedural rights for contemnors. The case, long a classic formulation of
a court's authority to compel obedience and to punish disobedience of its
orders, involved a post-World War II strike by coal miners against the
federal government, which had taken control of the most of the country's
coal mines pursuant to an executive order.' The United States had
obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) forbidding the
union and its leaders from encouraging the mine workers to strike.'
While the TRO was in effect, the federal district court considered
whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived it of jurisdiction to entertain
the government's request for a preliminary injunction.2 4 The district
court ultimately concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply
to the case because of plaintiff was a government entity, and it issued a
preliminary injunction against the defendants.'25 In the meantime, the
defendants allegedly violated the TRO and were tried for contempt.'26
They were found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both civil and
criminal contempt, and the court fined the individual union president
$10,000 and the union $3.5 million.'27
Taking the case directly from the district court on certiorari, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the contempt convictions with one modifi-
cation. 2 The Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply to
the case, and as a result the court did have jurisdiction over the dispute.'29
As an alternative holding, the Court stated that even if the Norris-
120. See id.
121. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
122. Executive Order No. 9728 directed the Secretary of the Interior to operate the coal mines and
to negotiate with the miners' representatives regarding the terms and conditions of their employment.
President Truman was concerned that labor disputes in the coal industry might disrupt the fragile
post-war economy. See Exec. Order No. 9728, 11 Fed. Reg. 5593 (1946).
123. See UnitedMine Workers, 330 U.S. at 266-67.
124. See id. at 290.
125. See id. at 268.
126. See id. at 269.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 304-05.
129. See id. at 289.
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LaGuardia Act had applied to deprive the court ultimately of jurisdiction,
the court had authority to decide the jurisdictional issue and could
preserve the status quo between the parties by means of a TRO while it
considered that issue. 3 '
The U.S. Supreme Court then examined the procedures employed in
imposing the contempt sanctions and found that they conformed to Rule
42(b) of the newly enacted Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.' The
defendants were given sufficient advance notice of the allegedly
contemptuous acts and "enjoyed during the trial itself all the enhanced
protections accorded defendants in criminal contempt proceedings.' 32
The Court went on to find that the trial court properly adjudicated civil
and criminal contempts in the same proceeding. 33 Although the Court
conceded that it is preferable to try civil and criminal contempts
separately so that defendants clearly receive the required procedural
protections, the use of a combined proceeding is acceptable unless the
defendant shows "substantial prejudice."' 134
Finally, the majority opinion modified the fine imposed on the
defendant union on the basis that the existing sanction constituted
excessive punishment. 135 It split the $3.5 million fine into two parts: an
unconditional fine of $700,000 for criminal contempt and a conditional
fine of $2.8 million as coercive civil contempt. 36 The larger fine was
suspended pending full compliance with the lower court's orders within
five days.
137
130. See Ua at 293.
131. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) provides that all criminal contempts, except those
in the court's presence, have to be tried only after notice to the defendant. The notice "shall state the
time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of a defense, and shall state
the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such." Fed. R. Crim.
P.42(b).
132. UnitedMine Workers, 330 U.S. at 298.
133. See id at 298-99. Although the entire fine was paid to the United States, a portion of it could
still be considered civil because the United States was the party plaintiff.
134. Id at300.
135. See id at304-05.
136. See id.
137. The defendant union could comply with the court's decrees by withdrawing its previously
issued notice terminating the union's agreement with the government regarding the miners' working
conditions and by notifying the union members of the withdrawal of the notice. See id. at 305.
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Four justices dissented in United Mine Workers asserting various
grounds,'38 but Justice Rutledge in particular excoriated the majority's
blithe acceptance of the procedures used at the contempt proceedings:
"In any other context than one of contempt, the idea that a criminal
prosecution and a civil suit for damages or equitable relief could be
hashed together in a single criminal-civil hodgepodge would be shocking
to every American lawyer and to most citizens."' 39 Rutledge's procedural
critique centered on three points. First, the mixing of civil and criminal
contempts in a single proceeding increased the possibility that full-blown
criminal safeguards would not be accorded the defendant."4 Second,
there was no indication in this case that such safeguards were in fact
granted to the defendants.' 4 ' Finally, the unitary fines imposed made it
impossible for the defendants and for the appellate court to discern which
portion of the fine was criminal and which civil. 4 '
Rutledge underscored his view that criminal contempts constitu-
tionally required all of the procedural protections afforded to defendants
in ordinary criminal proceedings, with the possible exception of trial by
jury. 43 He also noted that the practice of many courts (including the
district court in this case) of not identifying the nature of the contempt
until it is imposed left defendants in the dark about their procedural
rights until the appellate stage.'" Furthermore, in a case like this where a
unitary fine was imposed, the appellate court has no way of evaluating
whether the civil portion was appropriately remedial or coercive or
whether the criminal portion was properly punitive.'45
138. Justices Douglas and Black believed that the unconditional contempt fine, even as reduced
by the majority, was excessive and that coercive sanctions should have been used first to induce
compliance. See id. at 332-34 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Justice Murphy argued that the Norris-LaGuardia Act clearly applied to this dispute and thus
deprived the district court of jurisdiction in the matter, therefore, as an order issued without
jurisdiction the TRO was void, and the defendants could not be cited for contempt for disobeying it.
See id. at 335-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 364 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 368 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 368 n.34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
142. "We can only speculate upon what portion of each 'fine' may have been laid to compensate
for damages, what for punishment, and what, if any, for civil coercion." Id. at 379 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
143. See id. at 374 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
144. "One who does not know until the end of litigation what his procedural rights are, or may
have been, has no such rights. He is denied all by a hide-and-seek game between those that are
criminal and those that are civil." Id. at 374 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 370-71 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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Although Rutledge's views did not carry the day in United Mine
Workers, they did set the stage for further development of procedural
rights in contempt cases under the Warren Court. Beginning in the mid-
1950s until the late 1960s, a minority of justices began to argue for
recognition of a constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal contempt
proceedings. The jury-trial advocates on the Court observed that
historically, serious criminal contempts were tried before juries, both in
America and England." Most of the thirteen original colonies, both
during the colonial period and subsequently during statehood, had
numerous statutory limits on criminal contempt penalties, resulting in
relatively trivial fines or short-term confinements.'47 Because of the petty
nature of the punishment, most early courts did not feel constitutionally
compelled to make a jury trial available for criminal contemnor.'48
Although the English practice was not as clear, there was substantial
evidence that jury-trial rights were accorded defendants in criminal
contempt proceedings where the contempt was committed outside the
court's presence.'49
In 1968, this position finally gained a majority of the Court in Bloom
v. Illinois,' ° at least with respect to serious, nonpetty criminal
contempts. The Court's jury-trial supporters saw the need to interpose
the jury between the court and the accused as a matter of fundamental
fairness. Speaking for the Court, Justice White stated that
"[c]ontemptuous conduct... often strikes at the most vulnerable and
human qualities of a judge's temperament.... [I]t frequently represents a
rejection of judicial authority, or an interference with the judicial
process .... ,',' Although a good judge will try to be dispassionate, it is
often difficult for a judge, especially one who issued the original
injunction, to be completely impartial in adjudicating allegedly
contemptuous conduct.'
Furthermore, a majority of the Court ultimately concluded that
criminal contempt is not unlike an ordinary criminal offense, the trial of
146. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 367 U.S. 681, 740-53 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting);
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 202-06 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
147. See Barnett, 376 U.S. at 740-53 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
148. See, e.g., Respublica v. Oswald, I U.S. 319,329 (1788).
149. See Green, 356 U.S. at 202-06 (Black, J., dissenting).
150. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
151. Id at202.
152. See id. at 203- 05.
369
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which, if serious, must include a jury-trial right under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.'53 Criminal contempt is imposed as a
punishment for disobedience of a legal commandment, as embodied in
an equitable decree. It is an offense against judicial authority and as such
a public wrong. It can result in lengthy imprisonment and substantial
fines."'54
In the years following Bloom, the Court continued to work out the
details of its application, but the Court had made the basic decision that
serious criminal contempts constitutionally require the availability of a
jury trial. Despite the Court's changing composition in the post-Warren
era and its increasingly conservative bent, it has not retreated from
Bloom and has in fact proceeded to refine the procedural protections
afforded contemnors. The Court's 1987 decision in Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A.,' 55 however, revealed the extreme
divergence of views as to exactly what those protections should be.
In Young, the plaintiff leather manufacturer sued the defendants for
federal trademark violations.'56 The parties ultimately settled the suit,
with the defendants' agreeing to entry of a permanent injunction
prohibiting them from manufacturing or selling goods bearing plaintiff's
registered trademark.'57 Several months later, having reason to believe
that the defendants were violating the injunction, the plaintiff petitioned
the trial court to have its attorneys appointed as special prosecutors to
investigate the defendants and possibly prosecute them for criminal
contempt. 158 The court granted the plaintiff's petition, and the plaintiff's
attorneys prosecuted the defendants for criminal contempt.'59 After a jury
trial, the defendants were convicted and sentenced to terms of
imprisonment ranging from six months to five years."
On appeal, the defendants argued that the district court improperly
appointed the plaintiff's attorneys rather than a disinterested attorney as
153. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968).
154. See Cheffv. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
155. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
156. See id. at 790.
157. See id. at 790-91.
158. Seeid. at 791-92.
159. The U.S. Attorney's Office, although informed of plaintiff's attorney's appointment as
special prosecutor, expressed no interest in pursuing the case. See id. at 792.
160. See id. at 790 n.1.
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special prosecutors to prosecute the criminal contempt. 6 ' After the court
of appeals affirmed the convictions, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
and held that the district court should not have appointed the attorneys of
an interested party to prosecute the contempt 62 Although eight of the
nine justices concurred in this view, their reasoning was remarkably
diverse.
Justice Brennan, joined by three others in his plurality opinion, held
that lower courts may not appoint an interested party's attorney to
prosecute a possible criminal contempt 63 Brennan rested his decision
not upon due process grounds, but upon the Court's inherent supervisory
power over the lower federal courts."6 Trial courts may appoint a
disinterested private attorney to prosecute the contempt, but plaintiffs'
attorneys do not have the requisite impartiality to serve as prosecutors
and would normally experience unacceptable conflicts of interest
between their pursuit of their clients' interests and a prosecutor's
mandate to seek justice. 65
Brennan's opinion was careful to balance the supposedly inherent
self-defense powers of the judiciary against the procedural rights of the
accused contemnors. The courts could not ensure obedience to their
orders if they had to await prosecution of criminal contempts by the U.S.
Attorney. This undercutting of the judicial power of self-defense would
dangerously diminish the viability of the courts as adjudicators and
lawgivers." At the same time, a disinterested prosecutor presumably
will not pursue criminal contempts in weak cases and will litigate those
contempts that it does pursue with an eye towards justice, not
vengeance.167
Two justices, while concurring in the finding of error in the court
below, would have pushed the fairness/impartiality argument even
further. Justice Blackmun believed that the conflict-of-interest concerns
required appointment of a disinterested prosecutor as a matter of
161. SeeiL at 793.
162. Seeid. at 814.
163. See id at 790.
164. See id at 802.
165. Seef dat 804-05.
166. "The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that
the Iudiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other
Branches." Id at 796.
167. Seeid. at 803.
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constitutional due process.'68 And Justice Scalia advanced the novel view
that at least the federal courts do not possess inherent authority to
prosecute individuals for disobedience of their orders.'69  The
Constitution contemplates that only the "judicial power of the United
States" may be vested in the federal courts. 7 ' According to Scalia, the
"judicial power" is "the power to decide, in accordance with the law,
who should prevail in a case or controversy."'' It does not include what
is essentially part of the executive function, the prosecution of those who
have allegedly violated the law. Prosecution and neutral adjudication
cannot coexist in the same sphere.
72
While radical and arguably unprecedented, Scalia's views are a
natural extension of the Court's and commentators' basic discomfort
with the conflated judicial roles of conflict adjudicator and law enforcer.
When issuing an injunction, a court basically declares what the law is in
a specific context and demands that the parties conform their behavior to
that standard. If they do not and are punished for their disobedience, that
punishment is not significantly different from the sanctions imposed on a
defendant in a criminal proceeding based on the violation of a criminal
statute or ordinance. If a defendant in an ordinary criminal prosecution is
entitled to the benefits of a prosecutor selected by an elected executive,
then an alleged contemnor arguably should have those benefits as well.
Following Young, the U.S. Supreme Court has continued to adhere to
the view expressed in Bloom that criminal contempt is a crime in the
ordinary sense. In United States v. Dixon,'73 the Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred the subsequent
criminal prosecution of a defendant who had already been held in
criminal contempt for violation of a civil protection order. 74 In that case
the civil protection order, among other things, had ordered the defendant
not to use illegal drugs or to assault his wife.'7 5 He was convicted of
168. See id. at 814-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
169. See id. at 815-16 (Scalia, J., concurring).
170. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
171. Young, 481 U.S. at 816 (Scalia, J., concurring).
172. Scalia conceded, however, that the courts may use criminal contempt to punish disruption of
ongoing proceedings and disobedience of orders necessary to the court's functioning as an
adjudicator, such as an order to produce litigation-related documents. See id. at 820-21 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
173. 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
174. See id. at 711.
175. See id. at 692.
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criminal contempt based on his violation of those terms of the order. 176
Later the state sought to prosecute him based on the same incidents for
violation of criminal statutes relating to drug use and assault. 177 In a
plurality opinion, Justice Scalia stated that because the later criminal
charge contained the same elements as the earlier contempt conviction,
the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the subsequent prosecution.
178
Dissenting in part, Justice Blackmun raised the specter that the Court
had gone too far in equating criminal contempt with ordinary criminal
offenses. Although he agreed that criminal contempts required the full
procedural safeguards afforded defendants in ordinary criminal proceed-
ings, he foresaw a dangerous weakening of the judicial power in
regarding criminal contempt as a subset of the criminal law.179 Criminal
contempt in Justice Blackmun's view is "one of the very few
mechanisms available to a trial court to vindicate the authority of its
orders."'8 ° Without criminal contempt, trial courts will find it difficult, if
not impossible, to ensure respect of their orders and to provide redress
"to those who have sought the court's protection.''. In other words, if
the state's attorney prefers to prosecute contemnors for their criminal
offenses instead of for criminal contempt, the court's orders will become
virtually meaningless, and deserving plaintiffs will not receive an
adequate remedy for the wrong done to them.'
Justice Blackmun's dissent brings to the fore once again an idea that
has been obscured by the Court's continuing focus on the due process
issues surrounding criminal contempt-the idea that contempt is
intended as a remedial mechanism as well as a punishment for an offense
against the state. Injunctions, whatever their form, find their teeth in the
court's ability to impose fines and prison terms for violations of them. As
explored in greater detail below,83 contempt or some alternative
176. See iaL at 693.
177. See id.
178. See i&) at 700; see also Exparte Busby, 921 S.W.2d 389,391-93 (rex. Ct. App. 1996).
179. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 742-43 (Blackrnun, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
180. Id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., concurring in thejudgment and dissenting in part).
181. IM) at 743 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
182. One could argue, of course, that a criminal prosecution of a defendant would be as effective,
if not more so, at reforming the defendant's behavior than a criminal contempt citation. The criminal
penalties for drug-related offenses, for example, may be much more substantial than the maximum
permissible sanction for criminal contempt for violation of a civil protection order.
183. See infra notes 359-84 and accompanying text.
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enforcement mechanism is vital to the courts' function as a dispenser of
civil justice.
5. Civil Contempt in Front of the Supreme Court: The Neglected
Stepchild
As the U.S. Supreme Court moved steadily throughout the twentieth
century towards increasing recognition of procedural rights for criminal
contempts, it remained curiously static in its treatment of civil contempt,
both remedial and coercive. Two primary issues confronted the court in
the few civil contempt cases that it considered. First, the Court was asked
on occasion to examine the defining characteristics of coercive civil
contempt as opposed to criminal contempt. Second, it faced the question
of whether to enlarge the procedural protections afforded civil contem-
nors to match those eventually given criminal contemnors. Until Bagwell
in 1994, the Court seemed reluctant to increase procedural safeguards in
civil contempt cases.
The distinction between criminal contempt and coercive civil
contempt developed in the first Gompers case in 1911 was cited
repeatedly by the Court in subsequent cases.' "Criminal contempt serves
to vindicate the court's authority and to punish the contemnor for the
affront to that authority. Civil contempt serves the interests of the party
plaintiff and is either compensatory or coercive in character. Criminal
contempt is most often linked to past disobedience of a prohibitory
decree whereas coercive civil contempt induces compliance with a
prospective mandatory court order.
Many of the coercive civil contempt cases considered by the Court
within the last century involved decrees ordering production of evidence
or property in conjunction with an ongoing proceeding-that is,
compelling the defendant to testify before a court or administrative
agency,185 requiring the defendant to furnish books and records, 86 or
directing the defendant to turn over property to the court in a creditors'
or bankruptcy proceeding.'87 In these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has
184. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585,
590 (1947); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947).
185. See, e.g., Gelbard v. United States, 403 U.S. 41 (1972); Shillitani, 384 U.S. 364; McCrone v.
United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939); Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105 (1936); Alexander v. United
States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752 (1983); Penfield Co., 330 U.S. 585.
187. See, e.g., Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1947); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217 (1932).
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held consistently that an indeterminate fine or term of imprisonment to
compel obedience of an affirmative order is a coercive civil contempt
that may be imposed in ordinary civil proceedings.
88
In the litigation-related cases and also in those involving orders to
perform some other type of affirmative act, the Court has focused almost
exclusively on "purgability" as the key feature of coercive civil
contempt. For example, in Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International
Ass'n v. EEOC,8 9 the district court had ordered the defendant union to
achieve twenty-nine-percent nonwhite membership by a particular
date."9° When the union did not reach the required goal, the court ordered
it to pay fines into a fund designed to increase minority union
membership." Although the union argued that the fines were punitive
and had been imposed without criminal procedures, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that they were civil and both remedial and coercive in
nature." The contempt's coercive aspect flowed from its purgability:
"[P]etitioners could purge themselves of the contempt by ending their
discriminatory practices and by achieving the court-ordered membership
goal; they would then be entitled, with the court's approval, to recover
any moneys remaining in the Fund."'93
Similarly, in Hicks v. Feiock,' 4 the Court held that the defining
characteristic of coercive civil contempt was whether the defendant could
avoid the sanction altogether by complying with the court order. In
Hicks, the defendant had been ordered to make child support
payments. 95 When he failed to do so, he was adjudged in contempt and
sentenced to a total of twenty-five days in jail.'96 The sentence was
suspended, and he was placed on probation for three years. 97 Probation
could be revoked and the jail sentence could be reinstituted if the
188. See Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 365; Maggoo, 333 U.S. at 67-68; Doyle v. London Guarantee &
Accident Co., 204 U.S. 599,604-05 (1907).
189. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
190. See id. at 432.
191. See id. at 435.
192. See id. at 443-44.
193. 1La t444.
194. 485 U.S. 624 (1988).
195. See id at 627.
196. See id at 628.
197. See id
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defendant did not make his support payments, including payments on
arrearages, in a timely fashion.'98
Before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Hicks defendant argued that
California law impermissibly imposed on him the burden of proving his
inability to comply with the support order.' After acknowledging that
consistent with Fourteenth Amendment due process the state cannot
impose on a criminal defendant the burden of proving an element of a
criminal offense,200 the Court then faced the task of deciding whether the
contempt sanction in this case was civil or criminal. Once again citing
Gompers, the Court stated that "the substance of the proceeding and the
character of the relief that the proceeding will afford" creates a method to
determine the nature of the contempt.20 1 The Court emphatically rejected
any attempt to classify contempts based on their underlying purpose,
noting that any given contempt serves both remedial and punitive
purposes to some extent.20 2
According to the Court, the "character" of coercive civil contempt is
defined by its conditional nature. The imposition of the contempt
sanction is conditioned upon the defendant's continuing failure to
comply with the court order:
The critical feature that determines whether the remedy is civil or
criminal in nature is not when or whether the contemnor is
physically required to set foot in jail but whether the contemnor can
avoid the sentence imposed on him, or purge himself of it, by
complying with the terms of the original order.20 3
Ultimately, the Court could not determine the purgability of the
contempt sanction from the record below-it was unclear whether the
defendant could end his three-year probation term by making up all of
the child support arrearages that he owed.21 If so, then the "relief
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. "If applied in a criminal proceeding, [the California] statute would violate the Due Process
Clause because it would undercut the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at
637.
201. Id. at 631.
202. "[T]his Court has never undertaken to psychoanalyze the subjective intent of a State's laws
and its courts, not only because that effort would be unseemly and improper, but also because it
would be misguided." Id. at 635.
203. Id. at 635 n.7.
204. See id. at 639-40.
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imposed here is in fact a determinate sentence with a purge clause [and]
civil in nature."'2 5 If the contempt were civil, then the state could
constitutionally require that the defendant carry the burden of proof on
his inability to comply with the order.206
At the same time that the U.S. Supreme Court was adhering to the
Gompers definitions of criminal and coercive civil contempt, it showed
no inclination until the Bagwell decision to increase the procedural
safeguards accorded contemnors at civil contempt hearings. Before
Bagwell, the Court had uniformly held that civil contempt sanctions may
be imposed in ordinary civil proceedings,20 7 that a prosecuting plaintiff
need not prove contempt beyond a reasonable doubt,208 that a jury trial is
not available because the action is in equity,2° that a defendant has no
constitutional right to be confronted by his accusers or to refuse to
testify,210 and that double jeopardy does not apply.21' Civil contempt,
unlike criminal contempt, was held not to require willfulness on the
defendant's part21 2 and not to be appealable apart from the main
213
equitable action.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination cannot necessarily be invoked to
block enforcement of an injunction by means of civil contempt. In
Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight,214 the Court
held that a mother who was ordered to produce her child in conjunction
with his removal from her home could not invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in resisting civil contempt sanctions
for her failure to comply with the order.2"5 Although Justice O'Connor in
205. Icd at 640. Three dissenting justices thought that the contempt sanction was undeniably civil.
A suspended determinate sentence coupled with a period of probation is conditional and thus
coercive in nature: "[A]s long as [the defendant] meets the conditions of his informal probation, he
will never enter jail." Id. at 650 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at 645-46.
207. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,442-43 (1986).
208. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 645 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
209. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364,365 (1966).
210. See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983).
211. See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 150 (1956).
212. See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949).
213. See Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936).
214. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
215. See U at 561; see also Rylander, 460 U.S. at 758 (asserting that defendant could be held in
civil contempt for his refusal to produce records pursuant to IRS summons even though he invoked
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege).
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her majority opinion conceded that the mother's act of producing her
child might be considered testimonial in nature and possibly
incriminating, she emphasized that the state had an overriding interest in
the child's welfare as part of "a regulatory regime... unrelated to the
enforcement of its criminal laws." '216 Thus the defendant could be
imprisoned via coercive civil contempt until she agreed to produce her
child or disclose his whereabouts.217
This historical review of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of civil
and criminal contempt reveals that until the Bagwell decision in 1994,
the lines between civil and criminal contempt were fairly well drawn (at
least in the Court's mind), and the procedural schism between the two
had been reasonably delineated and accepted. The Court's 1994 decision
in Bagwell, like Gompers eighty years previously, represents a watershed
in the Court's thinking about contempt and shows a sharpened awareness
of the potential judicial abuse of the contempt power as distinguished
from the necessity for contempt as an enforcement tool.
II. BAGWELL AND ITS IMPACT ON LOWER COURTS
A. International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell: Is There
Anything Left of Coercive Civil Contempt?
On April 4, 1989, the International Union and the Local District 28
Union of the United Mine Workers of America began a strike against
two Virginia mining companies, Clinchfield Coal Company and Sea "B"
Mining Company.2 The unions charged the companies with certain
unfair labor practices, and the companies in turn sought an injunction
against the unions to prohibit various actions associated with the strike." 9
The circuit court of Russell County, Virginia, issued the injunction,
which established picketing guidelines and prohibited certain disruptive
activities, such as placing tire-puncturing devices ("jackrocks") on roads
216. Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 556.
217. Justice O'Connor suggested, however, that if the defendant's production of her child proved
to be incriminating (that is, because the child was injured or deceased), the state might be limited in
its ability to use her self-incriminating act in subsequent criminal proceedings. See id. at 561-62.
218. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 402 S.E.2d 899, 900
(Va. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 423
S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1992), rev'd, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
219. See id.
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used by company vehicles, blocking entrances to the companies'
facilities, and physically threatening company employees 020
Union members apparently violated the terms of the order on
numerous occasions. The circuit court held an initial show cause hearing
on May 16, 1989, and found seventy-two separate violations of the
injunction?2' On May 18, 1989, the court found the unions in contempt
and imposed fines on them totaling $616,000 payable to the Common-
wealth of Virginia.'m On the condition that the unions pay $212,000 of
the fines within ten days and comply with the injunction in the future, the
circuit court suspended $400,000 of the fines.' The court also indicated
that future nonviolent and violent violations of the injunction would
result respectively in $20,000 and $100,000 in "civil" flnes. 4
Ultimately, the trial court held seven subsequent contempt hearings
and found that the defendants had committed over four hundred separate
violations of the injunction.' The court levied a total of $64 million in
contempt fines against the unions, $12 million of which was to be paid to
the plaintiff companies. 6 The remainder was made payable to the
Commonwealth of Virginia and the two Virginia counties most affected
by the strike activities. 7 The fines payable to the governmental units
were designed to compensate them for their law-enforcement expenses
incurred in dealing with the strikers."m
At the various contempt proceedings, the circuit court afforded the
defendants the normal rights of civil litigants, including the right to
introduce evidence, conduct discovery, and call and cross-examine
witnesses. 9 Believing that the contempt proceedings were civil in
nature, however, the court did 'not invoke any of the heightened
220. See Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 423 S.E.2d 349, 351 (Va. 1992),
rev'd, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
221. See Clinchfield Coal, 402 S.E.2d at 900.
222. See iad
223. See id
224. See id
225. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 824 (1994).
226. See id.
227. See le
228. See id
229. See id
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protections required in a criminal proceeding, with the exception of the
weightier burden of proof.3
While the unions' appeals of the contempt sanctions were pending, the
unions and the companies settled the underlying dispute." As part of the
settlement, they agreed that the companies would move to vacate the
contempt fines and to dismiss the lawsuit."2 The circuit court granted the
motions and vacated the $12 million portion of the fines payable to the
companies."' However, the court refused to vacate the fines payable to
the two counties and the Commonwealth of Virginia, even though the
counties also joined in the motion to vacate the fines. 4 The judge stated
that the remaining fines were coercive and civil in nature and for the
benefit of the public, not the litigants. 5
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and
vacated the remainder of the contempt fines.236 The court stated that it
need not decide whether the fines were criminal or civil in nature
because the law in either situation required their dismissal.237 If the fines
were considered criminal, they were invalid because the trial court did
not afford the defendants a criminal trial in violation of the U.S.
Constitution and various U.S. Supreme Court precedents."s
According to the Virginia Court of Appeals, if the fines were
denominated civil, they still had to be vacated because of the settlement
of the underlying litigation. 9 Recognizing this issue to be one of state
law, the court noted that Virginia case law suggests that the courts should
"rigidly adhere to procedures that maintain the distinction between civil
and criminal contempt."2' Traditionally, all civil contempt sanctions,
230. The trial court stated the burden of proof to be "beyond a reasonable doubt," but apparently
applied the criminal standard only "out of an abundance of caution," as opposed to necessity.
International Union, United Mine Workers v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 402 S.E.2d 899, 901 (Va. Ct.
App. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 423 S.E.2d 349
(Va. 1992), rev'd, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 902 n.1.
234. See id.
235. See International Union, Union Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 825 (1994).
236. See Clinchfield Coal, 402 S.E.2d at 905.
237. See id. at 903.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 905.
240. Id. at 904.
Washington Law Review
whether compensatory or coercive, fall with the settlement or dismissal
of all issues involved in the litigation.24 Consequently, the coercive civil
fines in Bagwell disappeared when the parties settled the case.
The Virginia Court of Appeals conceded that coercive civil fines,
besides benefiting the party plaintiffs, also in part vindicate the court's
authority and serve the public interest in obedience of lawful judicial
orders.242 But their primary purpose is to coerce compliance with court
orders so that plaintiffs will obtain the relief that they seek.243
Vindication of the court's authority can be accomplished directly by a
court's imposing a criminal contempt penalty after the appropriate
criminal trial.2 "
Further appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia resulted in reversal
of the Virginia Court of Appeals decision.245 The Virginia high court
agreed with the portion of the appellate court's opinion labeling the
contempt fines as coercive and civil.246 The court analogized the
prospective fines schedule announced by the trial court to the per diem
fines that are the hallmark of coercive civil contempt.247 In each instance,
defendants know that a fine of a certain amount will be imposed for
violations of the court order and that they can avoid the fines by
complying with the order.24 Per diem fines are commonly used for
mandatory injunctions-for example, a situation where defendants are
fined $1000 per day until they produce a certain document. The
prospective fine schedule, the court observed, is more suited to the
prohibitory injunction-for example, a situation where the defendants
will be subject to a $10,000 fine if they cross plaintiff's property
249
again.
241. This conclusion assumes that the parties in their settlement agree that all contempt fines will
be waived. Presumably, the plaintiff could insist that the defendant pay all or some of the remedial
civil contempt fines as compensation for losses occasioned by the defendant's disobedience of the
court order.
242. See id at 905.
243. See id.
244. See id Of course, the court that suffered the affront to its dignity will sometimes not be the
one imposing the criminal contempt sanction. Often the State's Attorney will bring a separate
criminal prosecution before another judge.
245. See Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers, 423 S.E.2d 349, 360 (Va. 1992),
rev'd, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
246. See id at 357.
247. See id
248. "mhe Union controlled its own fate." Id
249. See id.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia also focused on the trial court's
avowed purpose in setting the prospective fine schedule. The trial court
repeatedly announced its desire to coerce the defendants into complying
with the court order.50 At the second contempt hearing at which the
judge found numerous violations of the injunction, he imposed the
previously announced fines and expressed his hope that they would be
sufficient to deter future violations of the court order.25'
Finding the fines to be coercive and civil, the Supreme Court of
Virginia then held that settlement of the underlying litigation did not
automatically vacate the fines.2  Preserving such fines is necessary "if
the dignity of the law and public respect for the judiciary are to be
maintained. 253 If coercive civil fines were automatically mooted upon
settlement of the underlying litigation, a recalcitrant litigant could simply
defer paying the fines until the case was settled and thereby avoid their
coercive effect 4.25  The trial court thus would lose an important tool by
which it ensures respect for its authority and obedience to its orders.255
The U.S. Supreme Court, on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
of Virginia, reversed the holding that the fines in question were civil in
nature and thus the trial court could impose them without affording the
defendant a criminal trial.2 6 Writing for a unanimous court,257 Justice
Blackmun held that the sanctions imposed were criminal and that without
a criminal proceeding the defendants did not receive due process."
250. The trial court stated, "I firmly believe that the fate of the union with regard to these violations is
in the hands of those members and leadership that we have seen here in court today.... I sincerely hope
that you will be able to conduct yourself in a law abiding manner...." Id
251. See id.
252. See id. at 358.
253. Id.
254. See id.
255. The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that its decision was consistent with U.S. Supreme
Court precedent-specifically, the decision in Gompers. See id. 359-60. In Gompers, the Court set
aside civil contempt sanctions against a union because the underlying dispute was settled, but unlike
Bagwell, the civil contempt was compensatory in nature and not coercive.
256. International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 839
(1994).
257. All justices concurred in the Court's judgment with Justice Scalia writing a separate opinion.
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg also concurred separately, but did not join in the
portion of Justice Blackmun's opinion that called for criminal procedures for all indirect contempts
of complex injunctions. See id. at 848 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
258. See id. at 837-38.
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Justice Blackmun started by reviewing the basic distinction between
criminal and civil contempt first enunciated in Gompers and
subsequently embraced by state and lower federal courts. Justice
Blackmun observed that Gompers Court had used the "character and
purpose" of the contempt sanction imposed as the linchpin of the
civil/criminal distinction. 9 A sanction that is remedial in nature and
benefits the party plaintiff is civil in nature; one that is punitive and
vindicates the court's authority is criminal." Even the Gompers opinion,
however, recognized that the stated purpose of the contempt sanction by
itself cannot be ultimately determinative of its classification.26" ' An
avowedly punitive sanction also has the effect of inducing compliance
with an ongoing judicial decree whereas an overtly remedial or coercive
sanction tends in some respect to ensure respect for the court's authority
as well.26
2
Relying primarily on Hicks, Justice Blackmun stated that the character
of the sanction is critical for determining whether it is civil or criminal.26
By character, Justice Blackmun apparently meant "purgability" of the
contempt. After reviewing several forms of contempt sanctions such as
determinate fines, fixed prison terms, per diem fines, and indefinite
imprisonment, 26 Justice Blackmun concluded that the ability of the
contemnor to avoid the sanction once imposed through compliance with
the court order is essential for classifying the sanction as coercive civil
contempt.65 In applying that standard to the facts of Bagwell, he then
found that the fine schedule previously announced by the trial court was
not purgable in the classic sense:
The union's ability to avoid the contempt fines was indistingu-
ishable from the ability of any ordinary citizen to avoid a criminal
sanction by conforming his behavior to the law. The fines are not
coercive day fines, or even suspended fines, but are more closely
analogous to fixed, determinate, retrospective criminal fines which
petitioners had no opportunity to purge once imposed. We therefore
259. Id. at 827.
260. See ia at 827-28.
261. See i& at 828.
262. "Most contempt sanctions, like most criminal punishments, to some extent punish a prior
offense as well as coerce an offender's future obedience." Id
263. See id
264. See i at 828-30.
265. See id at 837.
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decline to conclude that the mere fact that the sanctions were
announced in advance rendered them coercive and civil as a matter
of constitutional law.26
Justice Blackmun then went on to examine the need for additional
criminal procedure protections for the accused contemnors. He
concluded that because the injunction at issue was complex and far-
reaching, proscribing and mandating numerous behaviors by the
defendants over a long period of time and over a wide geographical area,
the fact-finding process was fraught with danger and the consequences to
the defendants of violations extremely serious.267 In that situation,
"disinterested factfinding and evenhanded adjudication were essential,
and petitioners were entitled to a criminal jury trial. 268
In his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun attempted to carry forward
the historic judicial balancing of two competing policy concerns
surrounding the imposition of contempt: "necessity and potential
arbitrariness. 2'69 Traditionally, a judge can use the contempt power with
few procedural constraints where "its exercise is most essential" 0 in
other words, in instances where an ongoing judicial proceeding is being
disrupted by violent, offensive, or recalcitrant behavior. There, the case
law uniformly acknowledges that judges can use summary procedures to
restore order and to enforce respect for the court's authority.27'
Justice Blackmun averred that as the necessity for swift punishment
diminishes, the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed greater procedural
requirements to guard against biased and arbitrary adjudication of
contempts . 72 Thus if a court chooses to punish a litigant for a direct
contempt at the conclusion of a trial, the court must afford the alleged
contemnor notice and hearing.273 Furthermore, severe criminal sanctions,
even for direct contempt, always require the availability of a jury trial.274
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. Id. at 838.
269. Id. at 832.
270. Id.
271. See id. (citing United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1975); Codispoti v.
Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 513 (1974); Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965)).
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 833.
384
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Finally, if indirect contempts are sanctioned with criminal penalties, they
require the protections of a full criminal trial.
2 75
On one level, Justice Blackmun's opinion can be viewed as a simple
classification of previously announced fine schedules for future
violations of an existing court order as criminal contempt, requiring
criminal procedures for their imposition. On that level, the opinion
breaks little new ground. It simply carries forward the classic
criminal/civil dichotomy developed by Gompers and its progeny and
states that prospective fines are no different from determinate criminal
penalties in a previously enacted criminal statute. In either case, would-
be offenders know in advance the punishment to which they may be
subject. Even though the sanction is known in advance and can be
avoided by not violating the statute or court order, it is still punishment
when it is imposed, and thus criminal procedures are required.
Even on this relatively straightforward level, one can quarrel with the
U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion about prospective fine schedules.
Justice Blackmun seemed to concede that per diem fines and even
suspended fines may be classified as civil contempts. In both cases, the
defendant can avoid the fine by complying with the court order. For
example, if the defendant is ordered to pay $1000 a day until it turns over
certain documents to a government agency, it can escape any monetary
sanction whatsoever by relinquishing the documents immediately.276
Similarly, in Bagwell the defendants could have avoided the $52 million
in fines by obeying the injunction. Immediate and continued compliance
"purges" or avoids the sanction. In the case of the classic coercive
sanction consisting of a daily fine, the defendant knows in advance what
the penalty for noncompliance will be.
Thus one can argue that the analogy between the prospective fine
schedule in Bagwell and per diem fines is just as tight, if not tighter, as
that between the Bagwell fine schedule and traditional fixed fines levied
for criminal contempt. Classic coercive contempt is forward-looking; it
anticipates future disobedience by the defendant and imposes a sanction
until the defendant complies. The Bagwell trial court's fine schedule also
anticipated possible prospective noncompliance by the defendants, and
when the violations occurred, the court imposed the fines as announced.
275. See id
276. Justice Blackmun also observed that control of the litigation process is essential to a court's
basic function, and consequently, the court could properly impose coercive sanctions through civil
proceedings. See id.
385
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Traditionally, criminal contempt is backward-looking; the defendant has
already violated the court order and is now being punished for its
disrespect of the court's authority. In that sense alone, the Bagwell fines
were more analogous to coercive civil rather than criminal contempt.
On another level, Justice Blackmun did not simply classify one
particular type of contempt sanction as criminal. He attempted to do what
some scholars have advocated for years: apply the idea that courts should
stop focusing mechanically on the civil/criminal distinction and instead
examine the policy justifications for requiring certain procedural
protections for specific sanctions.277 Why does criminal contempt require
heightened procedural protections including the right to jury trial, the
privilege against self-incrimination, the ban on double jeopardy, and so
forth? Justice Blackmun concluded that it was not only the purpose or
nature of the penalty that determined the appropriate procedures, but also
the type of injunction involved and the absence or presence of complex
factfinding.2 78
As the majority observed, the decree in Bagwell was lengthy,
elaborate, and far-reaching. 79 It aimed to control a wide variety of
behaviors by numerous individuals in an extensive geographic area over
a period of many months. Because of the numerous violations ultimately
found, the fines imposed were substantial. Given the broad code of
conduct created by the injunction, the large number of alleged
contemptuous acts, and the severity of the penalty, "disinterested
factfinding and evenhanded adjudication were essential, and petitioners
were entitled to a criminal jury trial. 280
In his opinion, Justice Blackmun took pains to elaborate his
"complexity" thesis. In Gompers, the U.S. Supreme Court in defining
civil contempt had postulated an affirmative decree, such as an order to
pay alimony or to surrender property to a receiver.2 ' If the defendant
refuses to do the required act, he can be imprisoned or fined until he does
so. According to Gompers, this penalty is a coercive civil contempt.
282
Justice Blackmun distinguished the simple affirmative decree described
277. See id. at 837-38.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 837.
280. Id. at 838.
281. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911).
282. See id.
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in Gompers from the complex order issued in Bagwell. 3 In the former
case, the potential facts in dispute at the contempt hearing are many
fewer than those in a case like Bagwell. Presumably, in a simple case the
judge can be trusted to determine the essential facts, such as whether the
defendant received notice of the decree, whether the defendant violated
it, and whether the defendant had the ability to comply. If the judge
makes an egregious error in factfinding, then the appellate court can
correct it. In the complex case, these same facts must be determined over
a longer period of time and in a variety of contexts. One can assume that
the risk of error and bias increase proportionately.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia expressed support for Justice
Blackmun's complexity thesis mainly on historical grounds.2" He
reviewed the history of injunctions and noted that the modem equitable
decree is totally different from its ancestors.285 Traditionally, equitable
decrees were straightforward resolutions of property disputes-for
example, a case where the chancery court ordered the defendant to
convey a piece of land to the plaintiff.286 Equity strictly eschewed any
order that would place the court in a position of ongoing supervision of
the dispute and the parties. Today courts often issue complex decrees
governing the operation of large institutions such as schools, hospitals,
and prisons.' By their nature, these decrees necessitate continued
judicial involvement in their enforcement. They impose an entire code of
conduct on the parties, not unlike a criminal statutory scheme.
Consequently, defendants accused of violating such an order deserve full
criminal protections at the contempt hearing.2"'
Critical scrutiny reveals some difficulties with Justice Blackmun's
effort to link the need for criminal protections with the complexity of the
decree. There seems to be just as much need for unbiased factfmding in
the case of simple decrees as in the case of complicated ones. Merely
because a court order is relatively simple in form does not mean that the
defendant will not hotly contest any asserted contempt or that the court
283. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 833-34.
284. See id at 840 (Scalia, J., concurring).
285. See id at 841-43 (Scalia, J., concurring).
286. See id at 841-42 (Scalia, J., concurring).
287. See id. at 842-43 (Scalia, ., concurring).
288. See id (Scalia, ., concurring).
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will be less inclined to bias or irrational adjudication." 9 Consider a
defendant who is ordered to pay child support-a concededly simple
order. The plaintiff alleges that certain payments were not made
according to the order's terms and has the court issue a show cause order
as to why the defendant should not be held in contempt. At the show
cause hearing, the defendant argues that she did not have the ability to
comply because she lost her job. The plaintiff then asserts that the
defendant is in fact working in her uncle's business, is being paid "off
the books," and has the ability to comply with the court order. To resolve
the factual issue of whether the defendant has sufficient income to
comply with the decree, the judge, if no jury trial is afforded, must
consider the credibility of a number of witnesses. In addition, the court,
despite its best efforts to be impartial, may fall prey to the weaknesses of
human nature and find itself repelled by the idea that the defendant is not
supporting her children, whatever her excuse. If one believes in the
jury's ability to leaven the potential bias and narrow-mindedness of a
single judge,29 then the defendant in this hypothetical situation should
have the right to a jury trial along with the other criminal protections at
her contempt hearing.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was more
comfortable in resting her classification of the contempt as criminal on
the traditional Gompers formula. She specifically rejected the portion of
Justice Blackmun's opinion arguing for criminal procedures wherever
the contempt flows from a "complex" order.2 9 ' According to Justice
Ginsburg, the Bagwell contempt fines are criminal because they were not
289. In Walters v. Glasure, 690 N.E.2d 937, 941 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997), for example, the trial
judge displayed what might be characterized as a hostile attitude toward the alleged contemnor based
on the judge's belief that the defendant questioned the court's ability to enforce its own orders. The
injunction in that case simply restrained the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs' use of
their real property. See id. at 938.
290. There is no question that judges may become emotionally involved in the suits before them.
Consider the comments of a judge holding the pilots' union in contempt for refusing to obey a
return-to-work order:
The ridiculousness of [the Union's position] is only surpassed by its outrageousness.... The
Union is responsible for the damages these passengers have suffered. It is also clear that the
Union leadership could care less about these people.... It is this Court's view that a minor labor
dispute has been transformed into nothing more than a shakedown.
American Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, No. 7:99-CV-025-X, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1376, at
*2-4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 1999). The court also made passing reference to "all the macho chest
beating and mouthing off by anonymous pilots.... Id. at *5.
291. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 848 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
Washington Law Review
purgable by the defendant and because the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that they survived the settlement of the underlying dispute.292 Both
of these characteristics are hallmarks of criminal contempt. Thus, at least
two members of the Court saw no need to discard the Gompers criteria in
this or perhaps in any case.
Justice Blackmun's opinion also leaves many unanswered questions
that the Court may have to confront in the future. One obvious question
flowing from Justice Blackmun's complexity concept is where the lower
courts should draw the line between simple and complex decrees. A
single affirmative order like the ones described in Gompers is simple; the
multi-provision injunction in Bagwell is complex. But does the Bagwell
order derive its complexity from the number of its provisions, the extent
of its geographic reach, its duration, the number of parties and nonparties
bound by it, or a combination of all of the above factors? Is complexity
defined not so much by the scope of the decree but its impact on society
as a whole? An injunction requiring the defendant to pay child support
arguably affects no one but the family involved-the mother, the father,
and the children entitled to support. An order to cease certain activities in
conjunction with a strike arguably can affect an entire county, a state, or
even the nation.
Another unresolved issue concerns the type of sanction imposed.
Justice Blackmun implied that if the injunction is complex enough, even
the classic forms of coercive civil contempt-per diem fines or indefinite
imprisonment-might require criminal procedures for their imposition.293
Suppose a court orders a defendant prison to make certain reforms in
prison operation by a certain date-for example, the defendant is ordered
to provide recreational opportunities for prisoners, to create a prison law
library, to upgrade the nutritional quality of the food served, and so forth.
The date arrives, and the plaintiffs allege that the defendant has not
complied with the court order. The court then imposes a daily $10,000
fine until the defendant complies. Traditionally, such a fine would be
considered coercive civil contempt and would require only ordinary civil
procedures. After Bagwell, the court order is arguably complex enough
to warrant the use of criminal procedures.2' The question then becomes
292. See id at 846-47 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
293. See id at 833-34.
294. Justice Blackmun was careful to state that the holding in Bagwell "leaves unaltered the
longstanding authority of judges to adjudicate direct contempts summarily, and to enter broad
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whether there is anything left of coercive civil contempt in complex
injunction cases. Do all contempts, other than compensatory civil
contempts, become essentially criminal and thus require use of criminal
procedures?
B. Subsequent Lower Court Reaction (or Non-Reaction) to Bagwell:
Do All Civil Contemnors Get Two Bites of the Apple?
The U.S. Supreme Court decided Bagwell in mid-1994. Since then
both lower federal and state courts have reacted to it in a decidedly "ho-
hum" fashion. Some courts have sidestepped it in cases that arguably
required its application as a matter of constitutional due process. 95
Others have distinguished it primarily on the purgable2 96  or
compensatory 97 nature of the contempt sanction at issue. Several courts
have relied on Bagwell in cases where the sanctions clearly would have
been classified as criminal even before Bagwell.298 And finally, a few
courts have scrupulously applied it and required use of criminal
procedures for the imposition of contempt sanctions that before Bagwell
some courts might have classified as civil."' All in all, the predominant
compensatory awards for all contempts through civil proceedings." Id. at 838. Notably absent from
this comment are coercive civil contempt sanctions.
295. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ironworkers Local 433, 169 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1999)
(classifying previously announced sanctions as civil rather than criminal); Evans v. Williams, 35
F. Supp. 2d 88, 98 (D.D.C. 1999) (denying defendants' demand for criminal jury trial and levying
over five million dollars in fines for violation of lengthy order); Labor Relations Comm'n v. Salem
Teachers Union, 706 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (holding substantial fine announced
in advance was civil); Jessen v. Jessen, 567 N.W.2d 612, 619-20 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
suspended determinate fine to be civil contempt).
296. See, e.g., United States v. Ayres, 166 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding per diem fines
to be coercive civil contempt because of defendant's ability to purge); United States v. Barnette, 129
F.3d 1179, 1182 n.7 (11 th Cir. 1997) (holding indefinite incarceration to be coercive civil contempt
because of defendant's ability to purge); Santibanez v. Wier McMahon & Co., 105 F.3d 234, 243
(5th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. McDougal (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 97 F.3d 1090,
1094-95 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
297. See, e.g., Daniels v. Pipe Fitters Ass'n Local 597, 113 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1997); Placid
Refining Co. v. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. (In re Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc.), 108 F.3d 609,
613-14 (5th Cir. 1997); Mother African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church v.
Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church, C.A. No. 12055, 1998 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 239, at *26 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1998).
298. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Yashinsky, 170 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
per diem fine to be criminal contempt when underlying order became moot); Crowe v. Smith, 151
F.3d 217, 227 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding flat, unconditional fines to be criminal contempt).
299. See, e.g., Bush Ranch, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co.-Benlate Litig.), 99 F.3d 363, 369 (11 th Cir. 1996) (holding monetary sanctions imposed on
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reaction of the lower courts, particularly state courts, has been a sub rosa
rejection of the Bagwell holding. These courts may resist, perhaps
subconsciously, the imposition of additional procedural restrictions upon
what they view as an inherent judicial prerogative and a mechanism of
self-preservation.
Several federal and state appellate courts have seemingly ignored the
possible application of Bagwell to contempt sanctions appealed to
them.3° In Webster v. State,"' for example, the Indiana Court of Appeals
held that a ninety-day suspended jail sentence imposed on a contemnor
for violating a restraining order was a civil contempt requiring only basic
civil procedures. 2 The contemnor had violated a court order requiring
him to stay away from his wife's residence. 3 The lower court sentenced
the contemnor to ninety days in jail." The jail sentence was suspended
pending future compliance with the restraining order and certain
conditions imposed by the court. °" Without citing Bagwell, the Indiana
Court of Appeals rejected the contemnor's argument that the suspended
jail sentence was a criminal contempt penalty.30 6 The court noted that the
defendant could avoid the sanction by complying with the court order in
the future and that therefore the contempt had a coercive, rather than a
punitive, effect.30 7
Arguably, at least one prong of the Bagwell decision would require
classification of the contempt in Webster as criminal.30 8 In Bagwell,
defendants for violation of discovery orders to be criminal even though defendants could avoid fines
by performing certain acts); Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1559
(I th Cir. 1996) (classifying fixed monetary sanction to induce IRS not to violate automatic stay in
bankruptcy as punitive); DiSabatino v. Salicete, 671 A.2d 1344, 1349-51 (Del. 1996) (holding
previously announced fines as criminal contempt under Bagwell).
300. See supra note 295.
301. 673 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
302. Seeid. at512.
303. See id at510-11.
304. See id
305. See id at 511.
306. See id at512.
307. See id
308. In an effort to harmonize its opinion with United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258 (1947), the Court in Bagwell suggested that the suspended determinate fines in United Mine
Workers were coercive civil contempt for two reasons: (1) the union could purge the fine by
complying with the court order, and (2) the order itself was relatively simple and straightforward,
requiring clearcut discrete acts by the union. See International Union, United Mine Workers v.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 830 (1994). In the Webster case, the suspended determinate jail sentence
resembled somewhat the sanctions in United Mine Workers: in both cases, the contemnor could
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Justice Blackmun suggested that the previously announced fines imposed
on the union were criminal because "[t]he union's ability to avoid the
contempt fines was indistinguishable from the ability of any ordinary
citizen to avoid a criminal sanction by conforming his behavior to the
law."3" In Webster, the appellate court implied that the previously
announced sanction of ninety days in jail could be imposed upon the
defendant at any time in the future when it was shown that the defendant
had violated the restraining order.31 Presumably, the defendant would
have no opportunity to avoid the jail sentence through compliance once
the court determined that a violation had occurred. In this sense, the
sanction in Webster was no different from the fine schedule set up by the
lower court in Bagwell.
Obviously, the extensive order in Bagwell governing numerous union
activities was much more complex than the relatively straightforward
order in Webster. But Justice Blackmun never indicated that he was
relying solely on the complexity element to distinguish criminal from
civil contempt.3 ' Part of the complexity analysis, moreover, rested on
the need for "disinterested factfmding and evenhanded adjudication" by
a jury in cases where the order was detailed, where the alleged
contumacious acts took place over a long period of time, and where the
fines were extensive.312 However, one could argue that the need for
disinterested factfmding and evenhanded adjudication is just as
compelling in the context of the restraining order in Webster: there are
likely to be hotly disputed factual issues as to whether the defendant
violated the order and the judge may be naturally sympathetic to the
avoid the sanctions by complying with the court order. In United Mine Workers, however, the
contemnor was required to perform three defined acts involving issuance of public statements to the
union membership within a limited period of time. See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 305. In
Webster, on the other hand, the contemnor was required to obey the various terms of a restraining
order for an indefinite period into the future. See Webster, 673 N.E.2d at 511. Furthermore, although
the U.S. Supreme Court in Bagwell alludes to the continued viability of United Mine Workers, it is
not at all clear that the Court would have permitted the imposition of contempt sanctions in the form
of substantial suspended fines without the use of criminal procedures.
309. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 837.
310. See Webster, 673 N.E.2d at 512.
311. Justice Blackmun stated explicitly, "We therefore decline to conclude that the mere fact that
the sanctions were announced in advance rendered them coercive and civil as a matter of
constitutional law." Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 837.
312. Id. at 837-38.
Washington Law Review Vol. 75:345, 2000
plaintiff wife's privacy interests. 3 Nevertheless, the Webster decision
made no reference to the Court's reasoning in Bagwell.
Other post-Bagwell courts have avoided classifying certain contempts
as criminal by distinguishing Bagwell from the facts before them.
Several courts have easily sidestepped Bagwell by finding the contempts
at issue to be compensatory in nature, 3 4 daily coercive fines,31 5 or
coercive indeterminate imprisonment. 6 According to these courts, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Bagwell left untouched compensatory civil
contempts3"7 and traditional coercive civil contempts consisting of per
diem fines or indefinite incarceration. 8 Other courts have recognized
that even traditional coercive fines once imposed tend to be punitive in
nature, and that these fines if substantial might require criminal
procedures for their imposition after Bagwell.319
In its 1998 decision in New York State National Organization for
Women v. Terry (Terry j.,32' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
discussed at length whether the Bagwell holding required criminal
procedures where the lower court had imposed daily fines on defendants
who violated an order prohibiting them from interfering the operation of
several abortion clinics.32' The original court order had provided that
313. Of course, a 90 day jail sentence would not entitle the contemnor to a jury trial even if it
were classified as a criminal contempt, as opposed to a civil contempt. See Codispoti v.
Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) (holding that contemnor has no right to jury trial where
sentence imposed is confinement for six months or less). It would entitle the contemnor, however, to
the other protections of criminal proceedings, such as the higher burden of proof, the right to
counsel, and the presumption of innocence. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., Daniels v. Pipe Fitters Ass'n, 113 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1997); Placid Refining
Co. v. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. (In re Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc.), 108 F.3d 609, 613-14
(5th Cir. 1997).
315. See Bartel v. Eastern Airlines, No. 96-5105, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 71, at *5-6 (2d Cir. Jan.
6, 1998).
316. See Euromed, Inc. v. Gaylor, No. 3-97-CV-0322-I, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 6, 1999); Hipschman v. Cochran, 683 So. 2d 209, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1996).
317. The Court stated explicitly in Bagwell, "Our holding, however, leaves unaltered the
longstanding authority of judges to adjudicate direct contempts summarily, and to enter broad
compensatory awards for all contempts through civil proceedings." Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 838.
318. See id. at 828-30.
319. See supra note 299.
320. 159 F.3d 86, 92-95 (2d Cir. 1998) (Terry V).
321. The order permanently enjoined the defendants from:
Trespassing on, blocking, or obstructing ingress into or egress from any facility at which
abortions are performed in the City of New York, Nassau, Suffolk, or Westchester counties
[and] physically abusing or tortiously harassing persons entering, leaving, working at, or using
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contemnors would be subject to "civil damages of $25,000 per day for
the first violation," with the fine doubling with each successive
violation.322
Subsequently, the trial court found that several defendants had
violated the court's orders and fined them in amounts ranging from
$25,000 to $100,000.323 Ultimately, after several procedural twists and
turns, the defendants sought a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court on the grounds that the contempt fines were criminal in nature and
under Bagwell required the use of criminal procedures.324 The Court
granted certiorari and remanded the case for further consideration in light
of Bagwell.325 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals then in turn vacated
the contempt fines and remanded the case to the district court, holding
that the nonpurgable fines were criminal in nature and had been imposed
without criminal procedural protections.326 The district court reinstated
the original fines, but gave the defendants the opportunity to purge the
fines if they obeyed the injunction and published within sixty days an
affirmation of intent to abide by its terms.327
In considering the defendants' appeal from the reinstated fines, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the fines constituted coercive
civil contempt and did not require criminal procedures for their
imposition even after Bagwell.328 The court emphasized that the district
court by including a purge provision "clearly indicated its intent that the
fines serve a coercive, rather than a punitive, purpose. '329 By obeying the
injunction, the defendants could avoid the fines completely.33° The court
any services at any facility at which abortions are performed in the City of New York, Nassau,
Suffolk, or Westchester counties.
New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd
as modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989).
322. See id. at 1252.
323. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 732 F. Supp. 388, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
324. See Terry V, 159 F.3d at 91.
325. See Pearson v. Planned Parenthood Margaret Sanger Clinic (Manhattan), 512 U.S. 1249,
1249 (1994).
326. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 41 F.3d 794, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1994).
327. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 952 F. Supp. 1033, 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
328. See Terry V, 159 F.3d at 95.
329. Id.
330. See id.
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of appeals briefly noted that the amount of the fines was "large enough to
warrant concern with the adjudication process," but that the "strong
indications" of a coercive purpose were enough to outweigh any
argument that the fines were punitive and thus required criminal
procedures.33'
In a case almost identical to Terry V on its facts, National
Organization of Women v. Operation Rescue,332 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that at least a portion of previously announced
contempt sanctions was punitive and required a criminal proceeding for
its imposition.333 The district court had enjoined the defendants from
blocking access to several abortion clinics.3" Upon later finding that the
defendants had disobeyed the injunction, the court set up a fine schedule
for future violations, with the fines payable to the plaintiffs.335
Defendants again violated the injunction, and the court imposed the fines
as previously announced.336
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that under Bagwell
these fines, to the extent that they were noncompensatory, were criminal
contempt penalties imposed without affording the alleged contemnors a
full criminal trial. Rather than focusing on the nonpurgability of the
fines, the court suggested that their relatively large size 33 ' and the
somewhat complex nature of the order mandated use of criminal
procedures under Bagwell.338 The Operation Rescue court also observed
that the case in question did not fall into any of the exceptions mentioned
in Bagwell-that is, contempt sanctions serving the court's need "to
331. See Ul
332. 37 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
333. The court conceded that some of the contempt fines could be compensatory and therefore
civil in character, and the court remanded the case to the district court for clarification of whether
any portion of the fines served to compensate the plaintiffs for damages incurred as a result of the
defendants' violation of the injunction. See id. at 661.
334. See id at 649.
335. See id at 650.
336. See id
337. Although not as large as the sanctions in Bagwell, "the fines here are large enough to invite
our scrutiny under the principles enunciated in Bagwell." Id. at 660.
338. "[O]n a scale of complexity ranging from simple affirmative acts... to highly complex
Bagwell-type prohibitory injunctions barring broad classes of illegal acts where criminal process is
required, the out-of-court acts prohibited by the court's order here fall closer to the Bagwell end of
the spectrum" k at 661.
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adjudicate the proceedings [immediately] before it" or an order directing
performance of "discrete, readily ascertainable acts.
339
One interesting side note to Operation Rescue is that the court
accepted without question the civil nature of a per diem fine levied
against one of the defendants for failure to appear in court. Because the
defendant had not appealed this fairly substantial fme,3" the court did not
discuss the issue at length, but it clearly believed that the fine was a
coercive civil contempt not subject to heightened procedures.34' One may
speculate that the Operation Rescue court viewed the fine as civil either
because it was avoidable by the defendant or because it sanctioned the
defendant for conduct that threatened the court's ability to adjudicate the
case.
Not surprisingly, other post-Bagwell federal and state cases divide
along the lines reflected by Webster, Terry V, and Operation Rescue,
either by ignoring, distinguishing, or following Bagwell. Perhaps the
most salient feature of the cases distinguishing Bagwell is the purgability
of the contempt sanctions. The Bagwell opinion's ultimate impact may
be to give defendants two bites of the apple. For instance, in Mower
County Human Services v. Swancutt,342 the Supreme Court of Minnesota
found a sixty-day jail sentence imposed upon a recalcitrant defendant
who had failed to pay his court-ordered child support to be a coercive
civil contempt.343 Finding the defendant in contempt, the lower court had
sentenced him to sixty days in jail but had suspended the sentence
provided that he make up the arrearages and pay future support in a
timely manner.3" On appeal, the Minnesota high court held that "the trial
court mistakenly ordered Swancutt to serve 60 days in... jail, rather
than up to 60 days, which would entitle Swancutt to be released before
60 days upon compliance with the court ordered conditions.""34 The court
339. Id. at 660 (quoting International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 833
(1994)).
340. One defendant was fined $41,600 ($100 per day for 416 days) for disobeying the court's
order to appear in court. See id. at 650.
341. "The Bagwell Court discussed but did not call into question the traditional classification of
some categories of contempt sanctions-compensatory fines, coercive imprisonment, and per diem
fines to coerce compliance with affirmative court orders-as civil in nature." Id. at 659 (second
emphasis added).
342. 551 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1996).
343. See id. at 222.
344. See id. at 221-22.
345. Id. at 221 n.2.
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went on to review the trial court's order "as corrected"34 and to hold that
the contempt was coercive civil, primarily because the defendant could
avoid the jail sentence in whole or in part by complying at any time with
the court order.347
According to Terry V, Swancutt, and other similar post-Bagwell cases,
a lower court may use ordinary civil procedures to impose contempt
sanctions so long as the defendant may avoid the sanctions at any time
by obeying the court's decree. But what happens if the defendant
continues to be disobedient? In Swancutt, for example, if the sixty-day
jail sentence contained no purge clause, then it would have been
classified as criminal contempt. The same is true for the fines in Terry V.
If the Swancutt defendant had failed to obey the court order, he would
have suffered immediate execution of the previously announced
penalties. By adding a purge clause, the same sanctions become coercive
civil contempt, even applying Bagwell strictly. In that instance, the court
would inform the recalcitrant defendant that he had again violated the
court order and would then impose the previously announced sanctions,
again affording the defendant the opportunity to avoid them by now
obeying the order.
Many courts seem to assume that most defendants will now come to
their senses and avoid the sanction through compliance. But the evidence
shows that in many cases, for whatever reason-stubbornness, passionate
devotion to a cause, a somewhat marginal ability to comply with the
order-defendants continue to disobey.34 In that case the defendant
would suffer the full force of the previously announced fines or jail
sentence, all without the benefit of a criminal trial. In sum, disobey once
and one cannot be sanctioned consistent with constitutional due process
without criminal proceedings; disobey twice and one can.
Although the Bagwell Court undoubtedly desired to protect alleged
contemnors from biased adjudication and arbitrary punishment, it left a
large loophole for the lower courts to sanction disobedient defendants
346. Id.
347. See a at 222.
348. Susan McDougal, one of the witnesses subpoenaed by Independent Prosecutor Kenneth Starr
to appear before the Whitewater grand jury, refused to testify and served 18 months in prison for
civil contempt. She asserted that she would never cooperate with Starr's investigation because he
wanted her to implicate falsely President and Mrs. Clinton. See Susan McDougal Released from
Prison, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 26, 1998, at IA.
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severely without affording them a criminal trial.349 Justice Blackmun's
focus on the severity of the sanctions, the complexity of the order, and
the need for dispassionate and careful factfinding by a jury seemingly
becomes irrelevant once the trial court adds a purge clause to the
contempt order. The argument that purgable contempts are less deserving
of criminal procedures because the defendant can avoid them through
compliance is revealed as circular. All contempts, fixed or indeterminate,
purgable or nonpurgable, can be avoided through compliance. As long as
a defendant never disobeys the court order, she will not be subject to any
contempt sanction.
Perhaps at bottom, the U.S. Supreme Court was willing to leave
untouched traditional coercive civil contempts because of its belief in a
basic trait of human nature: it is one thing to contemplate the imposition
of a severe fine or term of imprisonment; it is quite another to actually
experience the stinging effect of such sanctions. If a contempt sanction is
nonpurgable, the defendant, if found guilty, will go to prison or suffer a
fine. In that case, the alleged contemnor arguably should have the full
panoply of criminal procedural protections. If the contempt sanction is
purgable, defendants at any time after imposition can terminate their
confinement or the accruing fines by complying with the jural command.
As mentioned previously, many courts seem to think that the typical
defendant will do whatever it takes to stay out of prison or to avoid
substantial fines.35°
The problem with this assumption, however, is that defendants may
think that they are complying with a court order, but the court upon the
plaintiff's motion for contempt sanctions may find that the defendant has
349. A recent Supreme Court of South Carolina case sharply illuminates the difficulties of
applying the Bagwell analysis. In Poston v. Poston, 502 S.E.2d 86, 88 (S.C. 1998), the respondent
had been ordered not to visit or have contact with her children. The family court later found her in
willful contempt and sentenced her to 120 days in prison. See id. She could "purge" herself of the
contempt by future strict compliance with the court order. By implication, however, if she violated
the order in the future, the prison sentence would be reinstated without any opportunity to purge at
that point. On appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina said that it simply could not determine
under Bagwell and other authorities whether or not the contempt was civil or criminal: "[It is a
hybrid because the sanction has characteristics of both civil and criminal contempt." Id. at 91. The
court remanded the case to family court for a clarification of the contempt sanction. See id. at 92.
350. One scholar has asserted that the rational contemnor, subject to a coercive confinement, will
comply with the court order immediately or not at all. She argues that the current legal standard
mandating release of confined contemnors-that there is no "substantial likelihood" of compliance
through continued confinement-rewards hardened criminals, encourages dishonesty, burdens
judges, and is generally unworkable. Linda S. Beres, Civil Contempt and the Rational Contemnor,
69 Ind. L.J. 723, 756-58 (1994).
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not complied and consequently issue a sanction in a proceeding without
full criminal safeguards. In Teny V, for example, the lower court allowed
the defendants to purge the contempt fines by obeying the injunction not
to blockade abortion clinics and by publishing an affirmation of intent to
obey the decree within sixty days.s5 ' Suppose that the plaintiffs
subsequently allege that during the defendants' continued protests in
front of the plaintiffs' abortion clinics the defendants blocked access to
the clinics in violation of the injunction. The post-Bagwell cases imply
that the trial court, if it found continued violations, could then impose the
previously announced contempt fines after an ordinary civil proceeding
with the lower civil burden of proof and no jury trial. The defendants in
this hypothetical might have believed that they were complying with the
order and that their actions did not constitute a blockade of the clinics. In
other words, the defendants might have tried to purge the contempt
through compliance and yet been unsuccessful in the court's opinion in
so doing.52
In the end, the Bagwell Court's concern about due process in cases
involving large monetary penalties or long-term incarceration may not
have been fully satisfied by the complexity and purgability criteria set
forth in that case as the touchstone for distinguishing criminal and civil
contempts. The Court's most recent slice into the Gordian knot that
constitutes this eternally vexing area of law has produced some frayed
edges without really severing the knot. The next section of this Article
attempts to tease out some strands that will at least loosen the knot.
351. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 952 F. Supp. 1033, 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
352. It is perhaps easier to understand how the purge clause would operate to prevent sanctions
where the defendants are ordered to perform some affirmative act. For example, in Terry V, the
defendants were ordered to publish an affirmation of intent to abide by the court's decree within a 60
day period to avoid the coercive contempt fines. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry,
159 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 1998). If the defendants published something in an attempt to comply but
the court found it insufficient, the court could presumably give the defendants a few more days to
conform their published statement to the order's requirements. The court could indulge the
defendants' good faith misunderstanding of the order's commands to allow them one final attempt to
purge the contempt. At some point, however, even with affirmative orders, the court may find that
the defendants have not complied and that coercive sanctions must be assessed. See, e.g., United
States v. Darwin Constr. Co., 680 F. Supp. 739 (D. Md. 1988) (imposing coercive fines at rate of
$5000 per day for six days for defendant's failure to produce all records demanded in IRS summons
even though defendant had produced most requested documents in timely fashion).
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III. A REMEDIAL THEORY OF CONTEMPT
Much of the modem literature on the law of contempt-both U.S.
Supreme Court cases and scholarly works-has focused on theories of
procedural due process and the rule of law.3" 3 These theories emphasize
the potential for arbitrary and biased adjudication at contempt hearings
and the inadequacies of the procedures employed to impose contempt
penalties. In the nineteenth century, alleged contemnors, even those
punished for criminal contempt, had their compliance or noncompliance
with a court order adjudged by the same judge who issued the order."
They had no right to a jury trial, no right to confront their accusers, and
no privilege against self-incrimination. They had no advance knowledge
of the extent of the penalty that might be imposed, and the penalties
themselves, in most cases, had no statutory caps. Appeal rights were also
strictly limited, and often factual issues were not reviewed at all on
appeal.
Contempt was the one area in Anglo-American law in which the
functions of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches were
seemingly merged. A single judge created a legal rule, oversaw its
enforcement, prosecuted any violations of it, adjudged the innocence or
guilt of the accused violator, and imposed the sanction. This affront to
traditional separation-of-powers notions was justified by necessity and
history. The judicial system arguably could not survive as an effective
institution unless it could punish disobedience of orders or disruption of
its proceedings through the exercise of the contempt power. Furthermore,
criminal contempt was never viewed as a crime in the ordinary sense,
and thus it was not treated as requiring criminal proceedings."' 5 Because
chancery courts historically never used juries, the jury trial issue was
never really considered.
353. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 5; Richard C. Brautigam, Constitutional Challenges to the
Contempt Power, 60 Geo. L.J. 1513 (1972); Dudley, Jr., supra note 5; Richard B. Kuhns, The
Summary Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Perspective, 88 Yale L.J. 39 (1978); Luis Kutner,
Contempt Power: The Black Robe-A Proposal for Due Process, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1971); Robert
Allen Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power and the Constitution: The View from Without and
Within, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 34 (1976); Philip A. Hostak, Note, International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm Shift in the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 81
Cornell L. Rev. 181 (1995).
354. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 17 P. 698, 699 (Cal. 1888).
355. See In re Terry, 37 F. 649, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1889); Chipman v. Barron, 2 Ga. 220, 230 (1847).
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Unquestionably, modem ideas..6 of due process require that accused
contemnors be afforded greater procedural safeguards than they had at
the beginning of the twentieth century. Advocates of more procedural
protections for defendants accused of contempt have been rightly
concerned about the absence of effective checks on a single judge's
power and the inherent potential for arbitrariness and abuse.357 But the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bagwell signals a new direction in the
quest for protection of defendants' rights: it suggests that more and more
civil contempts will be put into the criminal category and require
criminal proceedings for their imposition."8
This inclusion of greater numbers of traditionally civil contempts on
the criminal side of the procedural ledger, however, fails to consider the
remedial underpinnings of coercive civil contempt."5 9 The focus on
accused contemnors' rights has neglected to some extent the legitimate
needs of plaintiffs in whose favor a court order has been issued." °
Plaintiffs who receive injunctions or other equitable decrees presumably
have demonstrated that they have no adequate remedy at law. 6' In other
356. Justice Scalia, however, would quarrel with any suggestion that changing notions of justice
should affect what is constitutionally required of due process: "It is not that the times, or our
perceptions of fairness, have changed (that is in my view no basis for either tightening or relaxing
the traditional demands of due process)... :'International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell,
512 U.S. 821, 843-44 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
357. See Dudley, supra note 5, at 1079; Kuhns, supra note 353, at 62-63; Patterson, supra note 5,
at41.
358. One scholar has advocated confronting directly the due process problems of coercive civil
contempt. Rather than re-categorizing civil contempts as criminal, he argues for statutory caps on
coercive civil contempt and a right of expedited appeal from a sentence of coercive confinement. See
Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement: The Terminally Stubborn
Contemnor, 48 Wash. & LeeL. Rev. 185,212-16 (1991).
359. Regarding the efficacy of equitable remedies, one commentator has remarked:
It is no more than a commonplace to note that the value of a right, to a litigant, is no greater than
the available remedy, and the remedy in equity is the injunction. This insight, however, should
be worked to capacity, and we have not done so until we realize that the remedy, the injunction,
is worth no more than its sanction, contempt.
Joseph Moskovitz, Contempt ofInjunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 780,780 (1943).
360. One court aptly described the weighing of interests that should shape contempt procedures:
"Contempt jurisprudence must attempt to balance the need of a court to enforce its orders with the
doctrine that a court's power to obtain compliance should be tempered by safeguards that ensure
fundamental fairness." Pompey v. Cochran, 685 So. 2d 1007, 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
361. Traditionally, chancery courts would not provide relief unless the plaintiff showed that its
remedy at law was inadequate or that it suffered irreparable injury-that is, an injury for which
money damages would be an insufficient remedy. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214
(1923). Modem courts almost inevitably recite the inadequacy or irreparable-injury rule as a
prerequisite to equitable relief. See, e.g., Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551, 553 (Alaska 1983);
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words, money damages will not make them whole. Assuming the court
orders are legally valid, these plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek.
Defendants who continually disobey valid court orders presumably cause
irreparable harm to the affected plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may try to seek
compensatory civil contempt as part of the main action before the court.
Even after Bagwell, such contempts can be prosecuted using ordinary
civil procedures.
To receive compensatory civil contempt, plaintiffs are faced with the
prospect of quantifying the harm that they suffer as a result of the
defendant's disobeying the order. They must prove actual damages by a
preponderance of the evidence.362 Because their injury is by definition
difficult if not impossible to measure in money terms, some plaintiffs
may not be able to recover any damages or they may recover less than
full compensation.363 Therefore, coercive civil contempt may be
necessary for some plaintiffs to receive complete relief.
By requiring that coercive civil contempts in complex injunction cases
be tried with criminal procedures, the courts potentially diminish the
effectiveness of that enforcement mechanism. Defendants gain the
protection of the presumption of innocence, the heightened burden of
proof, and the availability of a jury trial.3" In the federal courts, criminal
contempt procedures require prosecution by the U.S. Attorney or a
special independent prosecutor appointed by the court.365  Such
Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); In re
Marriage of Strauss, 539 N.E.2d 808, 812 (III. App. Ct. 1989); Borom v. City of St. Paul, 184
N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. 1971). Notwithstanding the courts' standard reference to the inadequacy or
irreparable-injury rule, one noted commentator has argued persuasively that the rule does not operate
as a significant barrier to equitable relief-courts denying equitable remedies do so for reasons other
than the rule. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule 20-23 (1991).
362. See Graves v. Kemsco Group, Inc., 864 F.2d 754, 755 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
363. In Ashcrafi v. Conoco, Inc., No. 7:95-CV-187-BR(3), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092, at *10-
13 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 1998), the defendant journalists violated the confidentiality of a settlement
agreement between Conoco and plaintiffs in a toxic tort case-an agreement sealed by order of the
court. Although Conoco estimated that the publication of the terms of the settlement agreement
would cost it millions of dollars in additional litigation expenses and higher settlement and verdict
amounts in the other toxic tort cases it was defending, the court ultimately assessed the journalists
only $500,000 as compensatory civil contempt damages. See id. at *31-32.
364. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221
U.S. 418, 444 (1911).
365. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). But the Court
in Young held that the court could not appoint the plaintiff's attorney as a special prosecutor. See id.
at 814; cf Wilson v. Wilson, 984 S.W.2d 898, 903-04 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that plaintiff's
attorney may be appointed to prosecute criminal contempt).
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procedures necessarily entail delay,3" expense, and an increased
likelihood that the defendant will be found not to have violated the
injunction.
It is useful to compare the position of plaintiffs seeking damages for a
tort or breach of contract with plaintiffs desiring equitable relief.
Plaintiffs in a typical tort or contract action must prove their substantive
claim and their monetary loss by a preponderance of the evidence.
Theoretically, restrictions on the recoverability of damages exist, such as
the certainty requirement, 367 the foreseeability doctrine,368 and the avoid-
able consequences rule.369 In practice, modem courts have tended to find
ways around these restrictions that have benefited plaintiffs.37
Once plaintiffs receive a judgment for money damages, enforcement
of the judgment is done extrajudicially. Plaintiffs can employ a variety of
techniques to ensure that the judgment is paid in the event that the
defendant does not pay it voluntarily. Garnishment of wages and bank
accounts, levy on real and personal assets, and creation of liens on real
estate are among the typical enforcement mechanisms.371' Assuming the
366. Over 150 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that criminal prosecution of contemnors
"is oftentimes found too tardy for the exigency of the case." Spalding v. New York ex rel. Backus,
45 U.S. (4 How.) 21,24 (1846).
367. Plaintiffs must prove their damages to a reasonable certainty. See Ware v. United States, 971
F. Supp. 1442, 1471 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Kuffel v. Seaside Oil Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 209, 216 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1970).
368. To be recoverable, consequential damages must have been reasonably foreseeable at the time
the contract was entered into. See Mohler v. Jeke, 595 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa. Super. Ct 1991); Arthur
Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. 1997).
369. Plaintiffs must take reasonable steps to mitigate their damages post-injury; damages that
could have been avoided through reasonable mitigation are not recoverable. See Bank One, Tex.,
N.A. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 29 (5th Cir. 1992); Cobo v. Raba, 481 S.E.2d 101, 107 (N.C. Ct. App.
1997).
370. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931)
(holding that if defendant's wrongdoing prevents exact calculation of damages, plaintiff may still
recover damages reasonably inferred); Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689,
693 (Cal. 1970) (holding that plaintiff did not need to mitigate her damages by accepting different
film role); Strate v. Cambridge Tel. Co., 795 P.2d 319, 322 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) ("Consequential
damages need not be precisely and specifically foreseen. ... "); Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 242
N.W.2d 372, 374 (Mich. 1976) (holding new-business rule does not bar recovery of anticipated lost
profits by recently created business); Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 915 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (holding that jury should be instructed to consider plaintiff's religious beliefs in determining
whether she properly mitigated her damages).
371. See Pierre K. Loiseaux, Cases on Creditors' Remedies 7-84 (1966).
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defendant has some non-exempt assets,372 successful plaintiffs will
receive at least part, if not all, of their judgment.373
One might question why a plaintiff receiving an injunction should be
in any weaker position than one obtaining a judgment at law. Coercive
civil contempt is in large part equity's equivalent to the post-judgment
enforcement mechanisms available at law. If a judgment creditor at law
is entitled to effective enforcement of its judgment, why should a
successful plaintiff in equity not have the same ability to obtain relatively
swift and certain enforcement of the court order in its favor?
Part of our discomfort with contempt sanctions and the procedures
employed in imposing them may stem from the fact that equity does not
use juries. There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in equitable
proceedings.374 Thus the injunction antecedent to any contempt
proceeding will have been issued by a judge who alone has found the
relevant facts and applied the law. In a tort or contract suit at law, either
litigant has the right to demand a jury trial. Despite the periodic criticism
of the use of juries in civil proceedings, most courts, commentators, and
citizens apparently consider juries an essential part of the judicial
process.375 Perhaps reflecting the popular mood, the U.S. Supreme Court
over the course of time has increased the availability of jury trials in civil
actions in its decisions interpreting the Seventh Amendment.376
A further comparison of legal and equitable remedies may illuminate
more sharply the inconsistency in affording criminal procedures for all
372. This is an unwarranted assumption in many cases. Judgment debtors, depending on the
applicable state law, can protect from levy everything from tools of their trade to a six-month supply
of food and fuel to their homestead to an unlimited number of household pets. Under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, furthermore, no more than 25% of a worker's take-home pay may be
garnished. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1994).
373. Of course, this description of enforcement tools ignores the considerable difficulties that
some judgment creditors experience in trying to find and collect assets from their judgment debtors.
Judgment debtors routinely hide assets, flee the jurisdiction, or put their wealth into intangibles, like
stock certificates and Treasury bills, that are hard to locate and collect. See, e.g., Knapp v.
McFarland, 462 F.2d 935, 940 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting sheriff failed in attempt to levy on judgment
debtor's treasury bills because of custodian bank's refusal to cooperate).
374. See Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc. v. Lewis, 196 F.3d 900, 910 (8th Cir. 1999); Dardovitch v.
Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125, 134 (3d Cir. 1999); Calabi v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 728 A.2d
206, 209 (Md. Ct. App. 1999).
375. See infra notes 412-415.
376. See, e.g., Chauffeurs Local No. 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990);
Lytle v. Household Mfg., 494 U.S. 545 (1990); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy
Queen, Inc., v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc., v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500
(1959).
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coercive civil contempts. Consider a situation similar to that in the
abortion-protest cases: a large-scale gathering of anti-abortion protestors
outside an abortion clinic. Protestors picket in front of the clinic's
facilities. At some point the picketing becomes violent-the tires on
clinic workers' vehicles are slashed by "jackrocks" placed in access
roads by picketers; picketers cross onto clinic property without
permission and damage it; clinic employees and patients are physically
threatened and assaulted.
If the clinic and its workers and patients wish to pursue their legal
remedies, they have two options: have the protestors arrested and
prosecuted for their criminal acts and sue for damages for trespass,
willful destruction of property, assault, battery, and other torts. In any
criminal prosecution, of course, the accused protestors would have all of
the normal criminal procedural protections. Their alleged crimes and the
corresponding penalties would be defined by statute. And they would
certainly have the right to a jury trial for all serious crimes.
In any tort suit for damages, the defendants would be entitled only to a
civil proceeding. Many of the procedural safeguards for defendants
overlap between civil and criminal proceedings: the right to notice and
the opportunity to be heard; the right to subpoena witnesses; the right to
be represented by counsel; the right to a jury trial in actions at law.377 But
many of the criminal protections are absent in the ordinary civil trial: the
privilege against self-incrimination; an indigent's right to appointed
counsel; the presumption of innocence; and the requirement that the state
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.37
Despite the lower level of procedural protection in civil trials, the
defendants in this hypothetical situation could be liable for substantial
compensatory and punitive damages. They might face a judgment for
thousands, if not millions, of dollars, representing the value of the
plaintiffs' destroyed personal property, the fair rental value of their real
property, lost business profits, their medical bills, lost wages, and pain
and suffering. If the defendants' conduct fits the applicable state standard
for punitive damages, the award could increase considerably.
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, might chose to seek an injunction
restraining the anti-abortion group and its members' activities. As a
threshold matter, the plaintiffs would have to show that their remedy at
377. See United States v. Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154, 1155 (8th Cir. 1977); In re Bianchi, 542 F.2d
98, 101 (lst Cir. 1976).
378. See United States v. City of Miami, 195 F.3d 1292, 1298 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
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law was inadequate. They could clear this remedial barrier in at least two
ways. First, they could argue that criminal law remedies are not sufficient
in this situation. Although picketers theoretically could be arrested for
trespass, assault and battery, destruction of property, and so forth, the
law enforcement agencies may not have sufficient resources to police the
strikers' ongoing and widespread activities. The penalties for some of
these infractions, moreover, may be relatively light and operate as an
insufficient deterrent to future transgressions. And finally, assuming the
arrested protestors are released pending trial, they are free to resume their
former activities; their ultimate punishment may be many months away.
Second, the plaintiffs will argue that monetary damages are also not a
satisfactory remedy. Individual protestors who committed trespasses or
put "jackrocks" in the roadway may be difficult to identify. Even if they
are identified, they may have insufficient assets to make a tort suit
worthwhile. Assuming the anti-abortion organization itself will be found
liable for some of the wrongful activities, the plaintiffs may still have
problems proving all of the intangible damages suffered by the continual
interference with their business and their employees. The plaintiffs may
end up undercompensated for the interruption of their business, lost
profits, and their employees' mental and physical pain and suffering.
Lastly, the plaintiffs will assert that money damages will not necessarily
prevent a recurrence of the wrong, that they should not continually have
to return to court as additional damages accrue, and that they should not
be forced to suffer an ongoing invasion of their personal and property
rights.
Suppose the court issues an injunction forbidding the defendant group
and its members from trespassing on clinic property, placing "jackrocks"
in the access roads around the clinic property, blocking ingress and
egress to the clinic's facilities, and assaulting clinic employees and
patients. The order also requires the defendant organization to issue a
statement that all picketing shall be done in a peaceful manner and that
no picketer may interfere with clinic employees or patients entering or
leaving the facilities. The organization is also ordered to place
supervisors at all picketing sites and to report any violations of the order
to the court.
A few days pass, and the plaintiffs assert that the defendants are
violating all of the injunction's provisions. One course open to the court
is to refer the matter to the public prosecutor for prosecution or to
appoint its own special prosecutor, with a view towards imposition of
criminal contempt sanctions. In many respects, a prosecution for criminal
contempt is analogous to the prosecution of the defendants for the
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statutory offenses described earlier. Like punishment for a felony or
misdemeanor, criminal contempt may not be imposed without a criminal
hearing, and in many states, the sanctions for criminal contempt are
statutorily defined. In other words, the ultimate punishment of the
defendants for violation of the injunction is procedurally and remedially
similar to their punishment for commission of a crime. 79
Plaintiffs may also seek compensatory civil contempt based on the
defendants' violation of the injunction. This approach brings them full
circle back to a legal-type damages remedy. The losses sustained because
of the defendants' disobedience of the injunction will be similar to those
alleged in the tort action described earlier.8 ° In addition, both a tort suit
and a civil contempt hearing will follow the same civil procedures, with
one major exception. Because the civil contempt hearing is part of an
equitable proceeding, neither litigant has the right to a jury trial.38'
Additionally, punitive damages are not allowed in civil contempt
proceedings unlike a typical tort suit."'
If criminal contempt finds rough analogues to statutory crimes and
compensatory civil contempt to compensatory damages at law, then
coercive civil contempt seems to exist in some kind of jurisprudential no-
379. One significant difference between criminal contempt and statutory criminal punishment is
the magnitude of the penalty. Some states severely limit the sanctions for criminal contempt. See,
e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108 (Michie 1987) (providing no fine in excess of $50 or
imprisonment for more than 10 days); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1218(a) (West 1982) (providing no
fine in excess of$1000 or imprisonment for more than five days); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4137(c)
(West 1995) (providing no fine in excess of $100 or imprisonment for more than 30 days). Other
jurisdictions such as Massachusetts, Nebraska, and the federal courts either have no limits on
criminal contempt penalties or the statutory limits exceed the corresponding criminal penalties for
similar activity.
380. The underlying basis for the damages may be different, however. Compensatory damages in
the legal action are premised on an injury caused by defendants' tortious conduct. Compensatory
civil contempt flows from defendants' violation of a term in the injunction, a term that may or may
not relate to tortious activity. For example, the hypothetical injunction required the anti-abortion
group to place supervisors at all picket sites. Failure to do so would probably not constitute a
common law tort, though it would violate the injunction.
381. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1966). One advantage for the
defendant in equity is that historically equity will not award punitive damages. In a case involving
repeated unlawful conduct by the defendants, some of whom have substantial resources, punitive
damages could dwarf the compensatory component of the award. See TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources, 509 U.S. 443, 451 (1993) (noting jury awarded $19,000 compensatory damages
and $10 million punitive damages).
382. See Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 52 (3d Cir. 1992); NLRB v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 882
F.2d 949, 955 (5th Cir. 1989); Costa v. Welch (In re Costa), 172 B.R. 954, 964 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
1994). One scholar has argued convincingly for the imposition of punitive damages along with
awards of compensatory contempt in some cases. See Rendleman, supra note 29, at 992.
Disobedience and Contempt
man's land. Theoretically, it does not exist to punish the defendant for
disobeying the court order or to compensate the injured plaintiff for its
losses. Its purpose is to induce compliance with the court's decree. For
some plaintiffs, coercion may be the only effective means of obtaining
full relief. Because of the severe statutory caps on criminal contempt in
many jurisdictions and the constitutionally mandated procedures,
criminal contempt arguably provides little incentive for many defendants
to comply with the injunction. A thirty-dollar fine, even imposed
multiple times for repeated contempts, does not rend the corporate
pocket book to any meaningful extent. Prosecution for criminal contempt
also may come long after the principal litigation has ended.
Similarly, compensatory civil contempt does little for plaintiffs where
damages are difficult to quantify," 3 or where the defendants have few
assets. If the defendant refuses to obey a court order to disclose the
whereabouts of her child so that the child's father can exercise his court-
approved visitation rights, compensatory damages do not afford a
satisfactory remedy to a father.384 The father needs and deserves
compliance with the court order.
At the same time, courts and scholars have been justly concerned with
the potential open-endedness of coercive civil contempt and its lack of
heightened procedural protections.385 Because of the statutory caps on
criminal contempt, coercive imprisonment or fines can greatly exceed
any penalty that a defendant might suffer by way of criminal contempt.
383. "In civil contempt proceedings, the plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for damages that
it did not actually experience." Time Warner Cable v. U.S. Cable T.V., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 321, 329
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
384. In wrongful death actions, of course, our system provides a monetary remedy for the death of
a child. See Howard v. Seidler, 689 N.E.2d 572, 578 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). But that remedy is
acknowledged to be only a necessary approximation of the actual loss suffered by the parents.
385. One court observed the procedural deficiencies and the potentially severe impact of civil
contempt on defendants in family law cases:
The consequences of a civil contempt in the area of child support enforcement are potentially
greater than those of a criminal contempt. Yet there are few procedural safeguards. Many
individuals are unrepresented and may be unaware of their rights-such as the right to periodic
review of the contempt order and the right to request a hearing to demonstrate that they no
longer possess the ability to pay. The consequences are even more dire for an indigent
individual caught in a "Catch-22" situation: he cannot afford to hire an attorney, yet he has no
right to an attorney because the court indulges in the assumption that no incarceration can take
place unless the contemnor possesses the present ability to pay.
Pompey v. Cochran, 685 So. 2d 1007, 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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A defendant could potentially be assessed thousands of dollars or spend
years in jail for refusing to comply with an injunction.
While focusing on the potential for biased enforcement, the procedural
critics have neglected, however, to consider the plaintiff's interests.
Plaintiffs seeking an equitable order presumably have no adequate
remedy at law. Their need for an injunction is palpable and possibly
urgent. Procedural constraints on coercive civil contempt potentially will
reduce the instances in which plaintiffs obtain the relief to which they are
entitled.
Part of the inherent problem with equitable decrees is the personal
command to defendants. Defendants are personally ordered to convey
property, give over documents, provide testimony, and so forth. Unlike
enforcement of money judgments, injunctions supposedly require some
affirmative cooperation on the part of the defendants. If defendants do
not cooperate, the court imposes sanctions by way of contempt. A better
enforcement system might employ mechanisms that do not require
defendants' cooperation-in other words, making enforcement of
equitable decrees more like that for legal judgments.
Currently, courts have a variety of techniques at their disposal to
accomplish the desired remedial result.386 If litigants refuse to produce
documents pursuant to a discovery order, the opposing party's version of
the information contained in those documents can be assumed to be
true. 87 If defendants refuse to pay child support in a timely fashion,
courts may order garnishment of a percentage of their wages.3"' If a
public institution such as a prison or a mental hospital refuses to institute
reforms, the court may appoint a receiver to run it for the period
necessary to implement the court-ordered changes.389
386. Even in cases of disruptive parties in the courtroom, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested
that the trial court has options open to it besides criminal contempt. In lieu of (or in addition to)
citing obstreperous defendants for criminal contempt, the judge could bind and gag them or remove
them from the courtroom until they promise to conduct themselves properly. See Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
387. See, e.g., Bonaventure v. Butler, 593 F.2d 625, 626 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding court may enter
default judgment against party who deliberately refuses to comply with discovery order).
388. See, e.g., Patton v. State Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 597 So. 2d 302, 302 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that trial court issued income deduction order for child support that
resulted in garnishment of father's wages).
389. See, e.g., Graddick v. Newman, 453 U.S. 928, 931 (1981) (noting trial court's appointment
of governor as receiver for state prison system).
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The advantage of these devices is that they do not require the
defendants' appreciable cooperation. As such, the court does not end up
policing the defendants' compliance or noncompliance with the
injunction. The court does not have to worry about whether contempt
procedures should be civil or criminal, and the plaintiffs obtain the relief
to which they are lawfully entitled.3
The central procedural critique that may hamper plaintiffs in their
attempt to obtain a satisfactory remedy has been the plea for the alleged
contemnor's jury trial rights. Critics of contempt procedures have always
argued for the defendant's right to a jury trial at the contempt hearing.39
Certainly, they argue, the judge who issued the original court order
cannot be dispassionate in adjudicating an alleged violation of it. But the
argument seems to go further-that even a different judge at a separate
proceeding cannot be completely objective, that the judge will
automatically, perhaps unconsciously, be offended by the alleged affront
to the court's authority. Therefore, the defendant deserves the right to
have a jury decide the factual issues because of this systemic bias.
There are several difficulties with this argument. Although a judge
may be naturally affronted by a defendant's disobedience of a court
order,392 it does not necessarily follow that the judge will be eager to find
evidence of that disobedience. In Bagwell, what incentive did the trial
judge have to find that the defendants were still blocking access to the
mines and putting tire-puncturing devices in the roadways?393 It is
certainly less burdensome to the court to find that the defendants are
largely or completely complying with the decree and to minimize the
plaintiffs' complaints about non-compliance than to face repeated
demands by plaintiffs for contempt sanctions.
390. Presumably the ultimate relief more closely tracks the court order when it is supplied by a
neutral party (such as an employer garnishing wages) or a sympathetic party (such as a receiver
appointed to oversee a prison) than when it is furnished by a reluctant party (such as the defendant).
391. See United States v. Barnett, 367 U.S. 681,739 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165, 194-95 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Dudley, supra note 5, at 1085-87.
392. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted:
Contemptuous conduct.., often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's
temperament. Even when the contempt is not a direct insult to the court or the judge, it
frequently represents a rejection ofjudicial authority, or an interference with the judicial process
or with the duties of officers of the court.
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,202 (1968).
393. In fact, the danger of bias is seemingly much greater in cases of disrespectful or disruptive
courtroom behavior where summary procedures are permitted out of necessity than it is where the
defendant allegedly violates an injunction out of the court's presence.
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Furthermore, at some contempt hearings there will be few factual
issues for the jury to decide. In cases involving the passionate protest of
social injustice, such as strikes, civil rights marches, and abortion clinic
rallies, the defendants often will admit to having violated the court order
as a way to move their cause forward. 4 In many of these instances, the
defendants are not so much disputing whether or not they violated the
order but whether the order itself is worthy of obedience.395 The
collateral bar rule in most jurisdictions prohibits litigation of the validity
of the underlying decree at the contempt hearing.396
Finally, creating a jury trial right for civil contempts does nothing to
alleviate the critics' main concern-that the penalty imposed may be
inappropriate or too severe. Even in the criminal contempt context,
where the jury trial right is available for serious penalties, the judge
alone still fixes the punishment.39' To coerce compliance, the court could
imprison the defendant indefinitely or impose a substantial daily fine.
Under current law, the coercive penalty would be reviewable only on
appeal at the end of the principal litigation.39"
In considering possible solutions to the threat of judicial abuse of the
contempt power, this Article suggests that increased procedural
protections at the contempt stage of the proceedings are not necessarily
the answer, especially where coercive civil contempt is involved. Instead
this Article proposes five reforms to address the potential for
arbitrariness in imposition of contempt sanctions while at the same time
protecting plaintiffs' remedial rights.399 First, the current procedural
394. In United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947), the defendant union
president "stated openly in court that defendants would adhere to their policy of defiance." Similarly,
in Bagwell itself, the Supreme Court of Virginia observed: "Notwithstanding the large fines, the
Union never represented to the court that it regretted or intended to cease its lawless actions. To the
contrary, its utter defiance of the rule of law continued unabated." Bagwell v. International Union,
United Mine Workers, 423 S.E.2d 349,359 (Va. 1992), rev'd, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
395. In United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1988), the city council
defiantly refused to comply with a court order to enact an ordinance requiring the construction of
public housing in white neighborhoods.
396. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967); Sid Dillon
Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc. v. Sullivan, 559 N.W.2d 740, 748 (Neb. 1997); State v. Bailey,
982 P.2d 57, 59 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 369, 679 P.2d 353, 357
(1984); cf In re Berry, 436 P.2d 273,281 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting collateral bar rule).
397. See, e.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 537 (1974) (Rehnquist, ., dissenting).
398. See Fox v. Capital Co:, 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936); Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 655 (9th
Cir. 1996).
399. Conceivably, reforms to the exercise of the contempt power could be implemented either
judicially or legislatively. Florida represents a recent example ofjudicial reform of civil contempt in
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protections accorded criminal contemnors should remain in place, but
additionally, state legislatures and Congress should enact limits on the
punishment that may be imposed for criminal contempt. Second, a
provision for jury trials in equitable proceedings with certain exceptions
should be legislatively created. Third, in enforcing equitable decrees,
courts should be required to explore methods other than contempt to
produce the desired outcome. Fourth, coercive civil contempt should be
expansively defined to include any pre-announced fine or term of
imprisonment that the defendant may avoid by complying with the court
order in the future. Fifth, a coercive civil contempt should be appealable
upon its imposition even if the underlying action is still not final.
A. Statutory Limits on Criminal Contempt Sanctions
Much of the impetus behind the U.S. Supreme Court's growing
concern in the 1950s and 1960s about the procedural deficiencies
attendant to criminal contempt hearings can be traced to the increased
penalties for criminal contempt. Both federal and state courts began to
impose multi-year prison sentences on convicted contemnors. ° These
severe sentences were a far cry from the relatively trivial punishments
given criminal contemnors in the early days of the Republic, during
family law cases. See Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, 723 So. 2d 208,
212-15 (Fla. 1998). Legislative restrictions on contempt, however, may run afoul of state
constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers. Some state courts have held that legislative
curtailment of the judicial exercise of the contempt impermissibly infringes on the courts' inherent
judicial power under the state constitution. See, e.g., Walker v. Bentley, 660 So. 2d 313, 316-17
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that state statute barring use of criminal contempt in domestic
violence cases unconstitutional); People v. Warren, 671 N.E.2d 700, 711-12 (Ill. 1996) (holding that
state statute prohibiting use of civil contempt in certain child visitation cases unconstitutional);
Hardin v. Summitt, 627 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Ky. 1982) (declaring unconstitutional statute limiting
punishment for contempt). Other state courts, however, have held that although the legislature may
not deprive the courts of their inherent authority to issue contempt sanctions, it may regulate the
exercise of that authority within reasonable limits. See, e.g., Walker v. Bentley, 678 So. 2d 1265,
1267 (Fla. 1996); State v. Jenkins, 950 P.2d 1338, 1343 (Kan. 1997); State ex rel. Holland v.
Miesen, 108 N.W. 513, 513 (Minn. 1906).
At the federal level, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress may place restrictions on the
exercise of the contempt power. See Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1904).
However, the power may "neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative." Michaelson v.
United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924). Arguably, none of the
proposed reforms in this Article would nullify or effectively curtail the courts' ability to punish,
coerce, or compensate through the exercise of the contempt power.
400. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 140 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (three-year prison term);
People v. Bloom, 220 N.E.2d 475 (I11. 1966) (two-year prison term).
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which a contemptuous individual might be placed in the stocks for up to
two hours or fined no more than five dollars.4 '
One of the primary criticisms of contempt, therefore, has been that the
punishments have been excessive. Availability of procedural safeguards
at the trial level, such as a jury trial, will not necessarily cure that
problem.402 Such safeguards ensure that the conviction of contempt is
grounded in fully adequate procedural due process, not that the
punishment imposed will be appropriate. While appellate review is
available to curb truly egregious punishments, the deferential standard of
that review may not produce many reversals. 3
Much of our unease with the judicial imposition of contempt sanctions
might be removed if the state and federal legislatures set forth specific
caps on criminal contempt penalties. If criminal contempt is truly a crime
in the ordinary sense of the word, then the legislature should mark the
parameters of permissible punishment for contempt as it does for all
other crimes. Although federal law does not cap criminal contempt,'
most states currently have in place legislative limits on criminal
contempt fines and prison terms.4 °5 Some of those statutes restrict
401. See, e.g., An Act Concerning Delinquents, 1 Conn. Pub. Stat. Laws 231-32 (1808).
402. See, e.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 537 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("The guarantee of jury trial ... in no way limits the sentence which may be imposed by the trial
judge in those cases where a guilty verdict is returned by the jury.").
403. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
contempt sanctions are reviewed to determine whether district court abused its discretion); Halaco
Eng'g Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 379 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that amount and appropriateness of
civil contempt should not be reversed "absent a definite and firm conviction that the district court
made a clear error of judgment"); Crawford v. Gay, 703 So. 2d 368, 371 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(holding that civil contempt is reviewed to see whether trial court abused discretion); Erickson v.
Erickson, 385 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. 1986) (same); Endersbe v. Endersbe, 555 N.W.2d 580, 581
(N.D. 1996) (same); see also Etoch v. State, 964 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Ark. 1998) (holding that criminal
contempt is reviewed to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence and reasonable
inferences); Eldridge v. Eldridge, 710 A.2d 757, 760 (Conn. 1998) (holding that grounds for appeal
from civil contempt are more restricted than for ordinary civil judgment); Sharpe v. Nobles, 493
S.E.2d 288, 291 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that civil contempt is reviewed to determine whether
there is competent evidence to support findings of fact and whether those findings support
conclusions of law). However, an appellate court will often review any legal issues relative to
contempt de novo. See, e.g., In re Welfare of K.E.H., 542 N.W.2d 658, 660 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
404. Federal law does limit the civil coercive confinement for recalcitrant witnesses to the life of
the relevant court proceeding, the term of the grand jury, or a total period of 18 months. See 28
U.S.C. § 1826(2) (1994).
405. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.50.010 (Michie 1998) (maximum of $300 fine or six months'
imprisonment); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1218(a) (West 1982) (maximum of $1000 fine and five days'
imprisonment); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-33a(a) (1988) (maximum of $500 fine and six months'
imprisonment); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 710-1077(7) (Michie 1999) (maximum of $5000 fine and six
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contempt sanctions to relatively nominal fines and minimal terms of
imprisonment.4 °6
The legislatures, in restricting the possible sanctions for criminal
contempt, could create different categories of contempt based on the
perceived wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.0 7 An individual who
disrupted a court proceeding could be subject to relatively light penalties
whereas those who hinder the litigation process by refusing to answer a
subpoena, for example, might be subject to more severe sanctions. The
most severe sanctions might be reserved for disobedience of court orders,
especially those with a strong public interest, or for misbehavior of a
court officer.
months' imprisonment); Iowa Code Ann. § 665.4 (West 1998) (maximum fine of $500 and six
months' imprisonment); Minn. Stat Ann. § 588.10 (West 1997) (maximum fine of $250 and six
months' imprisonment); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 566 (West 1994) (maximum fine of $500 and six
months' imprisonment); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.105(2) (LEXIS Supp. 1998) (maximum fine of
$500 or one percent of defendant's annual gross income, whichever is greater, and six months'
imprisonment); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 21.002(b) (West 1988) (maximum fine of $500 and six
months' imprisonment); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.21.040(5) (1998) (maximum fine of $5000 and one
year's imprisonment); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 785.04(2) (West 1981) (maximum fine of $5000 and one
year's imprisonment).
In some states there are limits on criminal contempt sanctions only where a jury trial is not
available. For example, under Illinois court rules the court may sentence the contemnor to a
maximum of six months in prison, a fine not to exceed $500, or both, if the contemnor has not been
afforded a jury trial. If a jury trial has been made available, then the court "may impose a reasonable
fine or sentence of incarceration." Illinois Sixth Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 8.1(c)(8) (West 1995); see also
Code Me. R. § 66(c)(2)(D) (1994) (providing that if prison term of more than 30 days or "serious
punitive fine" is imposed, then jury trial must be afforded the contemnor); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-
457 (Michie 1997) (providing that without jury trial, maximum contempt penalty is $50 fine or ten
days' imprisonment).
406. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-11-30(5) (1995) (maximum of $100 fine or five days'
imprisonment); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108(b)(1) (Michie 1996) (maximum of $50 fine and 10
days' imprisonment); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-7-4(5) (1994) (maximum of $500 fine and 20 days'
imprisonment); Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-17 (1991) (maximum of $100 fine and 30 days'
imprisonment); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-103 (1997) (maximum of $50 fine and 10 days'
imprisonment); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-902 (Michie 1996) (maximum of $20 fine and two days'
imprisonment).
Of course, a defendant found guilty of multiple instances of contempt could be sentenced
separately for each offense, resulting in an aggregate sentence considerably longer than the statutory
maximum. See, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. Richardson, No. 01-A-01-9706-CV-00274, 1998
Tenn. App. LEXIS 638, at *18 n.5 (Tenn. Ct App. Sept. 23, 1998) (sentencing contemnor to nine
counts of contempt for aggregate jail sentence of 90 days); Exparte Whitehead, 908 S.W.2d 68, 69
(Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (sentencing contemnor on 26 separate acts of contempt for aggregate jail
sentence of 26 months).
407. A few states provide different maximum penalties for different types of contemptuous acts.
See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.50.010 (Michie 1998); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4611 (West 1991); 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4137 (West 1995).
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The proposed statutory limits on criminal contempt sanctions would
reduce substantially the potential for arbitrariness in sentencing currently
associated with criminal contempt. At the same time, they would still
allow the courts the flexibility to peg sanctions at the upper or lower
limit of the legislative parameters based on the perceived degree of the
contemnor's willfulness, the existence of prior similar offenses, the
extent of the public interest, and other aggravating or mitigating factors.
In this way, the courts would retain criminal contempt as one of their
principal methods of self-defense, albeit within prescribed legislative
parameters.
B. Creation of a Jury-Trial Right in Equity
It is commonly understood that historically the British chancery courts
did not use juries; the Chancellor sitting alone made all relevant findings
of fact and conclusions of law.4'8 That tradition came to colonial America
and found its way into the Bill of Rights. The Seventh Amendment
provides that "in Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved."'  Although commentators from time to time have argued
that the common law jury has outlived its usefulness, costs too much, and
cannot cope with the complex issues raised in many modem lawsuits,41 0
there has been no serious movement to amend the Constitution to
eliminate the Seventh Amendment. 41' U.S. Supreme Court precedents
408. There is some dispute as to whether the English Chancellor in fact eschewed the use ofjuries
in 1791, the year that the Bill of Rights was enacted. Some historical evidence indicates that the late
eighteenth to early nineteenth century represented a transition period for the English equity courts
from reliance on juries as factfinders to the Chancellor's deciding all factual issues by himself. See
Harold Chesnin & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment: Jury
Trial ofIssues in Equity Cases Before 1791, 83 Yale L.. 999, 999-1000 (1974).
409. U.S. Const. amend. VIL
410. See, e.g., Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process, and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary
on the Zenith Case, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1571 (1983); Benjamin Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay of
Justice, 56 A.B.A. 1.950 (1970); David L. Shapiro & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish ofJury Trial
in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachel v. Hill, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 442 (1971).
411. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that the Seventh Amendment is not
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore not applicable to the states. See Walker
v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876). Most states have their own version of the Seventh Amendment in
their constitutions that preserves the right to jury trial in actions at law. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. I,
§ 16; Del. Const. art. , § 4; I1. Const. art. , § 13; Md. Dec. of R. art. V; Ohio Const. art. I, § 5.
A few years ago, Kentucky enacted a rule eliminating jury trials in cases deemed too complex for
the jury's ability to understand. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, however, held that the rule
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have also largely favored extension rather than contraction of the jury
trial right in borderline cases." 2
Unquestionably, the first Congress, which created the Bill of Rights,
viewed the jury-trial right both in civil cases at law and in criminal cases
as an absolutely essential buffer between the individual and the state.
Although it was primarily the anti-federalists who vociferously
advocated a constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial in civil
cases, 413 even the federalists recognized the importance of the civil jury
as a check on corrupt judges.414 Jury-trial supporters viewed a single
judge as much more readily corrupted by outside influences than an ever-
changing jury of twelve citizens.
In the early days of the Republic, juries were also regarded as a
repository of community wisdom and a protector of the downtrodden.
Although it was recognized that juries might sometimes give sway to
local prejudices and disregard the law to favor a local litigant or a
particularly sympathetic one, it was this very quality that commended
civil juries to some supporters. On the federal level, the primary
lawmakers and lawgivers-Congress and the federal judges-were held
to be especially suspect because of their natural allegiance to the monied
classes as opposed to the "average" citizen and their orientation toward
national, rather than local, policy. 415 It was hoped that juries would
violated the state constitutional right to a jury trial. See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., 908
S.W.2d 104, 109 (Ky. 1995).
412. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340 (1998); Markham v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370 (1996); Chauffeurs Local No. 391, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990);
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen,
Inc., v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
413. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
289, 295-99 (1966); Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 Hastings L.J. 579, 598-600 (1993); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of
the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639, 667-73 (1973).
414. Alexander Hamilton, the most widely published federalist, observed that both proponents
and opponents of the new constitution believed that the civil jury trials were essential in a
democratic society:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at
least in the value they set upon the trial by jury: Or if there is any difference between them, it
consists in this; the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter represents it as
the very palladium of free government.
The Federalist No. 83, at 614 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1909).
415. The anti-federalists were fond of quoting Blackstone's homage to the jury as a guardian of
the rights of the poor and downtrodden:
416
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ultimately do "justice" in a given case, rather than mechanically applying
the law to the facts, as a judge might feel bound to do.
Critics of contempt procedures often favor the creation of a jury-trial
right for all contempts, civil and criminal. In lieu of that solution, some
advocate enlarging the definition of criminal contempt to include some
arguably civil contempts to increase the availability of jury trials.416 But
the protections against corruption and classism that juries may offer are
best introduced at the order-issuing stage as opposed to the order-
enforcing stage of the proceedings. There is a strong argument that
litigants seeking or defending against imposition of injunction should
have a right to a jury trial as much as those seeking a judgment for
damages. 41 7
Historically, the English law courts' use of juries never took hold in
the chancery courts, but there is no compelling reason why that ancient
practice should continue to control today.4"' One might argue that equity
cases necessarily involve the exercise of discretion that lay juries are ill-
equipped to handle. Juries, however, are well designed to make findings
of fact relative to the dispute.49 Judges could then use their equitable
The impartial administration ofjustice, which secures both our persons and our properties, is the
great end of civil society. But if that be entirely entrusted to the magistracy, a select body of
men, and those generally selected by the prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state,
their decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias
towards those of their own rank and dignity; it is not to be expected from human nature that the
few should be always attentive to the interests and good of the many.
3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *379; see Letters of Centinel, No. II, from Freeman's Journal,
Oct. 24, 1787, in Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution 1787-1788, at 584 (J. McMaster & F.
Stone eds., 1888) (Judge Samuel Bryan quoting above passage from Blackstone).
416. See Patterson, supra note 5, at 63.
417. In lieu of amending the Constitution, Congress could authorize jury trials by statute in cases
involving equitable issues. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1994) (creating right to jury trial in contempt
cases "arising under the laws of the United States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining
orders in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute"); see also Michaelson v. United States ex
rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924) (holding constitutional Clayton Act
provision providing forjury trials in criminal contempts arising under Act).
418. The Texas Constitution, following the Spanish practice, provides for a jury trial right in all
civil actions, whether at law or in equity. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 10. Texas juries, however, only
adjudicate factual issues; they do not "determine the expediency, necessity, or propriety of equitable
relief." Casa El Sol-Acapulco, S.A. v. Fontenot, 919 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). This
Article's proposal for jury trials in equity would allow juries to decide, at least in an advisory
capacity, the appropriateness of equitable relief as well as the factual issues.
419. Even in the current system, juries often end up deciding the factual issues underlying a
request for injunctive relief. In cases involving claims for damages and injunctive relief, many states
and the federal courts provide that the jury first decide the issues relating to the legal claims. The
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discretion to deny an injunction or to grant it according to appropriate
terms. Even in complex cases, it is not clear that juries could not exercise
their own discretion in deciding whether or not particular relief was
appropriate. The jury's findings of fact could be made binding on the
judge, and its recommendation as to the appropriateness of equitable
relief could be made advisory. 420 To avoid undue delays for plaintiffs
seeking emergency relief, the jury-trial right could extend only to the
permanent-injunction stage of the proceedings. Defendants would not be
entitled to a jury trial at hearings for temporary restraining orders or
preliminary injunctions.
By incorporating juries into the order-issuing stage, the process of
imposing injunctions gains credibility. The jury would decide whether
the plaintiff had demonstrated serious harm likely of repetition, whether
the harm was compensable in money damages, and ultimately whether
the public interest favored some sort of injunctive relief. The first two
issues are primarily factual inquiries similar to those made in an ordinary
case at law. The third issue is arguably one that a jury is ideally suited to
adjudge-whether an injunction appropriately serves the public
interest.42' The jury, as the representatives of the community, will assess
perhaps more accurately than a single judge the relative importance of
various public concerns. For example, in a labor dispute, the jury could
weigh the benefit conferred on the public by allowing labor
jury's factual findings are then binding on the judge in the determination of whether or not to issue
an injunction. See, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., 494 U.S. 545, 552-53 (1990); Lee v. Aiu, 936 P.2d
655, 665 (Haw. 1997); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 662
(Utah 1990).
420. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the use of advisory juries and binding jury
trials with the parties' consent in cases that are not triable to a jury as of right. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
39(c). Thus under current procedure a federal district court with an equitable action before it could
empanel either an advisory jury or, with the parties' consent, a jury whose findings would be binding
on the court. Professor Rendleman, a leading injunctions scholar, favors leaving juries out of the
injunction-issuing stage of the proceeding. See Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law
Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. Fla. L. Rev. 346, 355 (1981).
421. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated at least provisionally its faith in a jury's ability to
decide sophisticated issues regarding the public interest:
The jury's role in determining whether a land-use decision substantially advances legitimate
public interests within the meaning of our regulatory takings doctrine presents a more difficult
question.... In this case, the narrow question submitted to the jury was whether, when viewed
in light of the context and protracted history of the development application process, the city's
decision to reject a particular development plan bore a reasonable relationship to its proffered
justifications.... Under these circumstances, we hold that it was proper to submit this narrow,
factbound question to the jury.
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 721 (1999).
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demonstrations against the public interest in protecting private property
rights and community tranquility. Particular legal principles, as explained
to the jury by the judge, would necessarily guide the jury's judgment of
this issue, but the ultimate decision would reflect, it might be hoped, the
community's consensus about particular disputes.
C. Use ofEnforcement Mechanisms Other Than Contempt
A court can avoid the procedural thicket surrounding contempt by
employing other enforcement mechanisms when a court order is
violated.4" The goals of punishment, coercion, and compensation can be
served as well or better in certain cases by these other enforcement
mechanisms.4' Rather than fining or imprisoning a recalcitrant defendant
who refuses to convey a piece of property, the court could execute the
conveyance itself and have the deed issued in the plaintiff's name.
Rather than finding a noncustodial parent who fails to pay back due child
support in contempt, the judge could permit garnishment of the parent's
wages or bank account in the appropriate amounts.4 24 In cases where a
party to litigation refuses to produce certain documents, the court could
assume the contents of those documents to be adverse to the party's
position in court. Courts currently use all of these methods to ensure
compliance with a court order without resorting to the contempt
power.4
422. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow the court to appoint agents to perform acts on
behalf of recalcitrant defendants:
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other
documents or to perform any other specific act and the party fails to comply within the time
specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some
other person appointed by the court and the act so when done has like effect as if done by the
party.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 70.
423. The Supreme Court of Michigan, recognizing the desirability of preferring other enforcement
mechanisms to contempt, stated that coercive imprisonment cannot be used when "execution,
attachment or garnishment may issue, or there is any other adequate remedy." Burton v. Wayne
Circuit Judge, 37 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Mich. 1949) (emphasis added).
424. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 270A/10 (West 1997) (providing for revenue recapture and
income withholding in child support cases).
425. See, eg., Bonaventure v. Butler, 593 F.2d 625, 626 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding trial court may
enter default judgment against party who deliberately refuses to comply with discovery orders);
Clarke v. Chicago B & Q Ry. Co., 62 F.2d 440, 441 (10th Cir. 1932) (noting that trial court
appointed master to abate nuisance after parties refused to obey court order); Patton v. State Dep't of
419
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These enforcement mechanisms offer several advantages over
contempt. First, they result in more certain enforcement of the underlying
order. When the court uses contempt sanctions to coerce obstreperous
individuals, the sanctions are inevitably imprecise-it is difficult to
ascertain what amount of fine or term of imprisonment will induce
compliance with the court order. If the court simply creates the desired
result through other means, enforcement is guaranteed.
A second advantage of noncontempt enforcement mechanisms is that
they avoid a contest of wills between the court and the contemnor.
Contempt often presupposes willful disobedience of a court order.426
Both criminal and coercive civil contempt potentially can engender the
unsightly spectacle of an individual resisting the court's lawful com-
mand. The contemnor is repeatedly punished or subjected to coercive
sanctions but still refuses to obey the court order. This contest of wills is
not only inefficient, it also promotes a view of the court as impotent and
ineffectual. Assuming the legitimacy of the court's actions, it should not
have to engage in a tug of war with parties before it. Self-executing
enforcement mechanisms allow the court to achieve the desired outcome
without having to wrestle with the party subject to the order.
Third, such enforcement methods may be used more efficiently than
contempt sanctions. Unlike criminal contempt, they would not require a
separate prosecution before a different judge and the availability of a jury
trial. Unlike coercive contempt, they would not necessitate indeterminate
fines and prison terms, both of which may involve repeated challenges
by the contemnor. Furthermore, criminal contempt and coercive civil
contempt both entail sanctions that ultimately may impede successful
enforcement of the underlying court order. Imprisoned defendants may
be hindered from complying with the court order because of their lack of
physical liberty-for example, they may be unable to produce documents
or to monitor striking workers at a picket site. Defendants subjected to
extensive fines may not have the resources to obey the court order-for
example, payment of child support.
Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 597 So. 2d 302, 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that trial court
issued income deduction order for child support that resulted in garnishment of father's wages).
426. To convict a defendant of criminal contempt, the prosecutor must ordinarily show that the
defendant willfully disobeyed the court order. Although coercive civil contempt does not technically
require a showing of willful disobedience, it is seldom used unless the defendant has shown a
deliberate resistance to the court's command. See, e.g., New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v.
Terry, 697 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); cf Exparte Ramon, 821 S.W.2d 711,713 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991) (holding coercive contempt invalid where contemnor was unable to pay).
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And finally, use of noncontempt enforcement mechanisms avoids
possible lengthy confinement of a defendant who has not had the
protections of a criminal trial. A number of scholars have argued that the
real procedural shortfall exists in civil, not criminal, contempt.427
Because so many contempt statutes strictly limit the fines and prison
terms available for criminal contempt, the prospect of a prolonged
incarceration, arguably without sufficient due process, is much more
palpable where coercive civil contempt is imposed.
Of course, not every order lends itself to noncontempt enforcement
mechanisms. If striking airline pilots are ordered to return to work, the
court might find it difficult to execute the commands of the order without
the defendants' participation.428 In some cases, the defendants' personal
performafce will be required to ensure that the proper result is attained.
If the defendants simply refuse to comply and other enforcement
mechanisms are not practicable, contempt sanctions may be the only
route for achieving enforcement of the order. A judge-made or legislative
rule, however, that noncontempt enforcement mechanisms be used first if
possible would reduce or eliminate many of the difficulties associated
with contempt while ensuring that plaintiffs receive the full benefit of the
court-ordered relief.
D. The Definition of Coercive Civil Contempt
As discussed previously, the U.S. Supreme Court has nearly
eviscerated the category of coercive civil contempt.429 The Court in
Bagwell suggested that imposition of any previously announced fines or
prospective prison terms may be classified as criminal contempt,
particularly if alleged violations of complex decrees are involved.43 As
explored earlier, this conflating of criminal and coercive civil contempts
has potentially adverse consequences for the judicial system and for
individual plaintiffs.43! Because of these consequences, this Article
advocates a renewed adoption of the traditional definition of coercive
427. See Moskovitz, supra note 359, at 824; Rendleman, supra note 358, at 212-16; Note, The
Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 120, 129-30 (1965).
428. As one court succinctly put it, "No one can make someone else go fly an airplane"
American Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, No. 7:99-CV-025-X, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1376, at
*5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 1999).
429. See supra notes 218-294 and accompanying text.
430. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821,833-37 (1994).
431. See supra notes 359-384 and accompanying text.
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civil contempt as any sanction resulting from a previously announced
penalty that the defendant could have avoided by complying with the
court order.432
A return to the traditional definition of coercive civil contempt would
provide more effective and more flexible enforcement of injunctive
orders than the recasting of coercive civil contempts into criminal
contempts. At the same time, given proper safeguards, the use of
coercive civil contempt need not seriously diminish defendants' due
process rights. Criminal contempt as a punishment for disobedience of a
court order certainly has a place in our jurisprudence, but its purpose and
manner of application are significantly different from the enforcement of
those orders through civil remedies. Criminal contempt, relatively
severely cabined by statutory and procedural constraints, can express
societal and judicial disapproval of those who flout the court's authority,
but it often cannot provide meaningful relief to litigants who are entitled
to it.
Because criminal contempts require a separate prosecution before a
different court and full criminal-type procedural protections, they are
necessarily less quickly imposed than coercive civil contempts. Because
of statutory caps on criminal contempt penalties, they often do not
sufficiently coerce obdurate defendants into complying with the court
order. Arguably a properly set coercive sanction can induce compliance
more quickly and more readily than criminal penalties. Assuming the
validity of the original court order, the party plaintiff is entitled to have
the order promptly enforced.
The hallmark of coercive civil contempt, as traditionally defined, is
purgability.433 Penalties that the defendant can avoid or reduce through
compliance with the court order have been classified historically as
coercive civil contempt.434 Fixed prison terms or fines imposed
retroactively to punish contemnors have always been regarded as
432. See State Div. of Family Servs. v. Bullock, 904 S.W.2d 510, 513-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995);
Bowman v. Tufts, No. 96 CA 6, 1996 WL 664866, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1996);
Ingebrethsen v. Ingebrethsen, 661 A.2d 403,405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
Coercive civil contempt should also necessitate a judicial finding of the defendant's present ability
to comply with the court order, otherwise the contempt sanctions become punitive in nature. See
Gregory v. Rice, 727 So. 2d 251, 256 (Fla. 1999).
433. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gibbs, 645 N.E.2d 507, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (stating that
"person held in civil contempt must be given an opportunity to purge himself of the contempt").
434. See Lynch v. Lynch, 677 A.2d 584, 589-90 (Md. 1996).
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criminal contempts4 5 In Bagwell, the Court suggested that once the
judge has announced in advance of a future violation that certain
sanctions will be imposed for the next contemptuous act, those sanctions
are no different from legislatively created penalties for criminal
contempt.436
But the inevitable overlapping of punitive and coercive effects in both
types of contempt should hot obscure the essential differences between
the two. First, the need to resort to coercive sanctions results from the
defendant's refusal to obey the court order. Rarely, if ever, will a court
announce coercive contempt sanctions if the defendant has not
previously disobeyed the order and either is continuing to disobey it or is
likely to disobey it in the future. Criminal contempt may be imposed
regardless of whether the defendant is now in compliance with the order
as long as there was a prior willful violation of it.437 Second, the amount
of the coercive sanction can be more finely tuned to achieve compliance
than a criminal penalty. Because of the statutory caps on criminal
contempt and the relatively narrow range of penalties available, it is
more difficult to tailor criminal contempt to fit the nature of the violation
and the resources of the defendant. Coercive contempt fines can be set at
a particular level based on the egregiousness of the violation, the need
for prompt compliance, and the defendant's ability to pay. As such, they
are more likely to result in immediate obedience by the defendant than
criminal sanctions.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Gompers first suggested that contempt
sanctions should be classified differently depending on whether the
underlying injunction was prohibitory or mandatory.438 With mandatory
435. A federal appeals court has noted that at the moment that coercive fines are assessed, they
are necessarily backward-looking, but that fact does not alter their essential character as civil
sanctions:
[Ilnevitably, wherever a compliance fine is assessed and an opportunity given to purge, the
failure to purge will bring about a due date. The due date occurs because the actor has failed to
use the key to the jail which the court provided. The occurrence of the due date does not
transform civil proceedings, whose sole aim is to secure compliance, into a criminal proceeding.
Were it otherwise, compliance with laws or orders could never be brought about by fines in civil
contempt proceedings. Always the final order requiring payment will follow the act or omission
which constitutes the failure to purge.
Hoffinan ex rel. NLRB v. Beer Drivers, Local Union No. 888, 536 F.2d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1976)
(citation omitted).
436. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 836-37 (1994).
437. See United States v. DiMauro, 441 F.2d 428, 432 (8th Cir. 1971).
438. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,442-43 (1911).
423
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decrees, the coercive effect of an avoidable contempt sanction is more
apparent. For example, if the defendant is ordered to produce certain
documents by a particular date and fails to do so, a daily fine assessed by
the court clearly has the purpose of inducing compliance. If defendants
wish to avoid imposition of the sanction, they can simply produce the
required documents. With prohibitory decrees, arguably any sanction for
violation has a punitive rather than a coercive effect. For example, if the
defendant is ordered not to place tire-puncturing devices on public and
private roadways, a fine imposed by the court after a violation appears to
punish the defendants for their offending act.
But if the fine is announced in advance of the violation and is imposed
for each occurrence, it arguably has the same effect as the coercive daily
fine described above. In other words, every additional violation of the
prohibitory injunction produces another fine just as every additional day
that passes without compliance with the mandatory injunction results in
another fine. In either case the defendant can avoid the fine by
complying with the court order. Thus, the imposition of any sanction
announced by the court in advance of a violation should be considered as
coercive, not punitive, in nature, regardless of the mandatory or
prohibitory character of the underlying decree.
E. Appealability of Coercive Civil Contempt
One of the traditional criticisms of civil contempt has been its non-
appealability until the court has issued a final order in the main equitable
action. Case law has generally held that, unlike criminal contempt, civil
contempt cannot be appealed apart from the underlying action.439 Thus if
a defendant is ordered to produce documents in the middle of litigation,
the defendant has the choice of either complying with the order or facing
coercive fines or even an indeterminate prison term." It may be months
before the court issues a final, appealable order or judgment, and in the
439. See, e.g., Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936); Doyle v. London Guarantee &
Accident Co., 204 U.S. 599, 603 (1907); Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1996); In re
Attorney Gen. of the United States, 596 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1979); Goldblum v. National Broad.
Corp., 584 F.2d 904, 906 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978); Jessen v. Jessen, 567 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Neb. Ct. App.
1997).
440. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that if the contempt order cannot be reviewed until
the court has issued a final decree, the appeal "may come too late to be of any benefit to the party
aggrieved." Doyle, 204 U.S. at 607. But the Court justified this result as the necessary price paid by
citizens subject to "a community governed by law regulated by orderly judicial procedure." Id.
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interim the defendant must essentially give up its resistance to the court
order or take the risk that coercive sanctions imposed for noncompliance
will eventually be overturned on appeal."
The impetus toward enlarging the definition of criminal contempt to
include contempts that would be classified as coercive civil under the
traditional approach stems in part from dislike of the Hobson's choice
that many defendants face when subject to a nonappealable interim
order. Rather than importing wholesale into the criminal contempt
category most coercive civil contempts, one could afford contennors the
right to appeal immediately the imposition of coercive civil sanctions.
Although conceivably this proposal would add some burdens to already
overworked appellate courts and create additional delays in the litigation
process, 2 the burdens and delays are arguably outweighed by the
benefits of additional due process afforded contemnors subject to
coercive sanctions. For one thing, it is not clear how many additional
civil contempts would become appealable by virtue of allowing interim
appeals. At present, a civil contempt judgment against a nonparty in a
pending suit is final and immediately appealable." 3 Preliminary
injunctions, moreover, are appealable orders,4' and presumably any
coercive sanctions imposed for violation of a preliminary injunction
could be appealed along with the order itself.
Additionally, long-term coercive sanctions, given their potential for
extreme penalties, should bear the scrutiny of an appellate court
immediately upon imposition. Otherwise contemnors could face lengthy
prison terms or enormous fines without any ability to have those
441. One commentator has detailed the hardships imposed upon defendants who face the
Hobson's choice of either complying with a court order or facing harsh coercive sanctions. See
Thomas J. Andr6, Jr., The Final Judgment Rule and Party Appeals of Civil Contempt Orders: Time
fora Change, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1041, 1084-100 (1980).
442. Professor Andr6 has also argued that the appealability of contempt sanctions imposed for
violation of discovery orders would produce in actuality a more efficient litigation system. Knowing
that coercive civil contempts imposed for failure to comply with discovery orders are appealable,
parties would have incentives to make their discovery requests more reasonable. As a result, fewer
deponents would resist the orders, producing fewer contempt citations. See Ua at 1077-80.
443. See Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 877 F.2d 787, 789
(9th Cir. 1989); In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 1987).
444. United States v. Bayshore Assoc., Inc. 934 F.2d 1391, 1395 (6th Cir. 1991); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1994) (providing for right of appeal of interlocutory orders "granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
injunctions").
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sanctions lifted until the underlying litigation is settled."5 In fact,
coercive civil contempts can greatly exceed criminal contempt penalties
in both size and duration, and criminal contempts are always appealable
independent of the underlying claim. Allowing coercive civil contempts
to be immediately appealable would guard against potential arbitrariness
and bias by the trial court that may be too wedded to the order it has
issued to be entirely objective in imposing appropriate coercive
sanctions.
IV. CONCLUSION
All four of the traditional categories of contempt have their proper
role in equitable proceedings. Concededly, judges can engage in
punishment of contemnors under the guise of coercive sanctions, thus
producing a degradation of due process rights. The U.S. Supreme Court
in Bagwell was rightly concerned that lower courts may impose huge
fines on alleged violators of injunctions without according them their full
procedural rights. On the other hand, successful plaintiffs are deserving
of effective and expeditious fulfillment of their substantive rights,
particularly in cases where important public policy concerns are
implicated. By recasting most coercive civil contempts as criminal
contempts requiring criminal procedures for their imposition, the U.S.
Supreme Court has implicitly undermined the lower courts' ability to
ensure enforcement of their orders and the plaintiffs' rights to receive
prompt and satisfactory relief. Because of the additional procedural
constraints imposed by criminal trials, many plaintiffs may have to wait
months, even years, before significant sanctions are imposed upon
violators of court decrees in their favor."6
Rather than conflating the categories of coercive civil and criminal
contempt, the courts and the legislatures at both the federal and state
levels should enact several procedural and substantive reforms to provide
greater protections to accused contemnors facing either criminal or
445. Obviously, in some cases the contemnor may attempt to refuse to pay the accruing coercive
fine until after an appeal may be heard. But the lower court, in response to nonpayment, may then
feel compelled to incarcerate the contemnor as further coercion. Unless the court agrees to stay the
sanction pending an appeal, the contemnor may end up serving a considerable length of time in
prison.
446. See United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1052, 1054
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (imposing criminal contempt sanctions over one year after violations of order
asserted).
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coercive civil sanctions. Statutory caps on criminal contempt penalties
will guard against excessive punishments by lower courts. Creation of a
statutory right to jury trial at the order-issuing stage of an equitable
proceeding will provide a relatively unbiased factfinder that reflects, on
some level, the conscience of the community. Requiring judges to use
initially noncontempt enforcement mechanisms will reduce the instances
in which the judge and the party subject to the order end up in a contest
of wills requiring the imposition of contempt. A return to the traditional
definition of coercive civil contempt will acknowledge the necessity for
this weapon in the court's arsenal in certain cases as the only mechanism
for guaranteeing that successful plaintiffs obtain satisfactory relief. And
finally, allowing contemnors subject to coercive penalties to prosecute an
immediate appeal will eliminate the Hobson's choice currently faced by
many defendants of either disobeying a potentially invalid order and
suffering extensive fines or prison time or obeying the order and
enduring a different set of harms.
Ultimately, the continuing debate about the different categories of
contempt might be advanced by renaming civil contempt. In reality, civil
contempt serves remedial, not punitive or retributory, goals. As such,
perhaps it should more properly be labeled "equitable enforcement" or
"sanctions in aid of a litigant." 7 A different name might assist the courts
in understanding that civil contempt, although denominated a form of
"contempt," does not in the end rest upon the defendant's contemptuous
attitude toward the court or its willful disobedience of a judicial order,
but instead upon the need to afford plaintiffs the remedy that the court
has determined they deserve." 8
447. One court has suggested revision of the nomenclature for contempt "For the purpose of
clarity, we advise the use of the terms 'remedial' and 'punitive,' rather than 'civil' and 'criminal.'
The latter are defined by the former, and extinguishing at least one layer of terminology will help
simplify the law of contempt." State v. Tatum, 556 N.W.2d 541,544 n.2 (Minn. 1996).
448. Two hundred years ago Blackstone observed that many contempts, especially those for
nonpayment of costs and nonperformance of awards, should "be looked upon rather as a civil
execution for the benefit of the injured party." 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *285.
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